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This dissertation constitutes two essays in the field of industrial organization. 
Specifically, the research focuses on empirically assessing the market effects of airline alliances. 
The first essay examines how codesharing, a form of strategic alliances, by airlines 
affects market entry decisions of potential competitors.  Researchers have written extensively on 
the impact that strategic alliances between airlines have on airfare, but little is known of the 
market entry deterrent impact of strategic alliances.  Using a structural econometric model, this 
essay examines the market entry deterrent impact of codesharing between incumbent carriers in 
U.S. domestic air travel markets.  We find that a specific type of codesharing between market 
incumbents has a market entry deterrent effect to Southwest Airlines, but not other potential 
entrants.  Furthermore, we quantify the extent to which market incumbents’ codesharing 
influences market entry cost of potential entrants. 
The second essay examines the effects of granting Antitrust Immunity (ATI) to a group 
of airlines.  Airline alliance partners often want to extend cooperation to revenue sharing, which 
effectively implies joint pricing of their products (explicit price collusion).  To explicitly collude 
on price, airlines must apply to the relevant government authorities for ATI (U.S. Department of 
Justice and Department of Transportation in the case of air travel markets that have a U.S. airport 
as an endpoint), which effectively means an exemption from prosecution under the relevant 
antitrust laws.  Whether consumers, on net, benefit from a grant of ATI to partner airlines has 
caused much public debate.  This essay specifically investigates the impact of granting ATI to 
oneworld alliance members on their price, markup, and various measures of cost.  The evidence 
suggests that the grant of ATI facilitated a decrease in partner carriers’ marginal cost, and 
increased (decreased) their markup in markets where their service do (do not) overlap.  
Furthermore, member carriers’ price did not change (decreased) in markets where their services 
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on price, airlines must apply to the relevant government authorities for ATI (U.S. Department of 
Justice and Department of Transportation in the case of air travel markets that have a U.S. airport 
as an endpoint), which effectively means an exemption from prosecution under the relevant 
antitrust laws.  Whether consumers, on net, benefit from a grant of ATI to partner airlines has 
caused much public debate.  This essay specifically investigates the impact of granting ATI to 
oneworld alliance members on their price, markup, and various measures of cost.  The evidence 
suggests that the grant of ATI facilitated a decrease in partner carriers’ marginal cost, and 
increased (decreased) their markup in markets where their service do (do not) overlap.  
Furthermore, member carriers’ price did not change (decreased) in markets where their services 
do (do not) overlap, implying that consumers, on net, benefit in terms of price changes. 
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Chapter 1 - Entry Deterrence and Strategic Alliances 
 1. Introduction 
In recent years, strategic alliances between airlines have become increasingly popular.  
The format of a strategic alliance between airlines can vary from a limited marketing 
arrangement, for example an arrangement between partner carriers that only makes their 
frequent-flyer programs reciprocal, 
1
 to more extensive arrangements that include reciprocal 
frequent-flyer programs as well as codesharing.  Reciprocal frequent-flyer programs effectively 
allow passengers that hold frequent-flyer membership with one carrier in the alliance to earn and 
redeem frequent-flyer points across any partner carrier in the alliance.  A codeshare arrangement 
effectively allows each carrier in the alliance to sell tickets for seats on its partners’ airplane, i.e., 
partners essentially share certain facilities, in this case airplanes, that are solely owned by one of 
the partners. 
Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances have on airfare 
[Brueckner and Whalen (2000); Brueckner (2001 and 2003); Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann 
(2004); Ito and Lee (2007); Gayle (2008 and 2013); Gayle and Brown (2012) among others]. 
2
  
However, there is a paucity of work that examines the impact that strategic alliances may have 
on deterring potential competitors from entering a relevant market.  This is a particularly 
interesting aspect of strategic alliances to study since a substantial amount of these alliances are 
formed between traditional major/legacy carriers, who may face increasingly stiff competition 
from the growing prominence of low-cost-carriers (LCCs).  Some researchers argue that hub-
and-spoke network carriers form and use strategic codeshare alliances to better compete with 
low-cost-carriers, [Mantovani and Tarola (2007)].  So the following series of relevant questions 
                                                 
1
 Membership in an airline’s frequent-flyer program allows the passenger to accumulate points each time the 
passenger flies on the airline.  The frequent-flyer program allows the passenger to be eligible for various rewards 
once the passenger accumulates points beyond certain pre-determine thresholds.  As such, frequent-flyer programs 
are designed to build customer loyalty to the carrier that offers the program. 
 
2
 Earlier contributions to this literature include: Oum and Park (1997); Park (1997); Park and Zhang (1998); and 




need careful study.  First, does the evidence support the argument that strategic alliances between 
major airlines, among achieving other goals, serve to deter entry of potential entrants to a 
relevant market?  Second, if an entry-deterrence effect is evident, is there a particular type of 
practice among alliance partners that is most effective at deterring entry?  Third, is there a 
particular type of airline that seems to be more deterred via such practice by alliance partners? 
3
  
Chen and Ross (2000) theoretically explore the anticompetitive effect of a particular type 
of strategic alliance, by which the partner airlines share important facilities such as airplanes, 
terminals etc.  They argue that this type of alliance can forestall a complete and competitive 
entry by another firm, that is, such alliances can have an entry-deterrent effect.  The mechanism 
through which Chen and Ross envisioned that a strategic alliance may deter a complete and 
competitive entry is as follows.  An incumbent offers to form a strategic alliance with a potential 
entrant, which takes the form of the incumbent willing to share its facility with the potential 
entrant in order to discourage the potential entrant from building its own facility and entering on 
a larger, more competitive scale.  In the context of a codeshare alliance, this would translate into 
the incumbent offering to let a potential entrant sell tickets for seats on the incumbent’s plane in 
order to discourage the potential entrant from putting its own plane on the route.  So based on 
Chen and Ross’s argument, entry-deterrent codesharing should primarily take place between a 
market incumbent and the potential entrant the incumbent is intending to deter. 
Lin (2005) uses a theoretical model to show that incumbents can use codeshare alliances 
as a credible threat to deter the entry of potential entrants who do not have significant cost 
advantage.  The author uses the model to show that, owing to joint profit maximizing behavior 
between allied airlines, there exists an equilibrium in which the joint profit of two allied airlines 
is higher than the sum of their individual profits if they were not allied.  In addition, this higher 
joint profit of the allied airlines comes at the expense of lower profit for a new non-allied entrant.  
This equilibrium implies that if market entry cost is sufficiently high, such that entry in the 
                                                 
3
 In a separate, but related airline entry-deterrence literature, Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1995); Hendricks, Piccione 
and Tan (1997); Berechman, Poddar and Shy (1998); Aguirregabiria and Ho (2010) among others have argued that 
hub-and-spoke route networks adopted by many legacy carriers do give these carriers an incentive and the ability to 
deter entry of other carriers that do not use hub-and-spoke route network, which include many low-cost-carriers.  
But this literature focuses on the entry deterrence effect of hub-and-spoke networks rather than more specifically on 
the entry deterrence effect of codeshare alliances. 
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presence of an alliance between market incumbents is unprofitable for the new non-allied 
entrant, but profitable if incumbents were not allied, then formation of the alliance can be done to 
strategically deter entry. 
4
 
In addition to Chen and Ross (2000) and Lin (2005) arguments why codeshare alliances 
may deter entry, we posit yet another mechanism through which a codeshare alliance may deter 
potential entrants from entering a market.  The idea is that codeshare partner carriers typically 
make their frequent-flyer programs reciprocal.  This has the effect of making frequent-flyer 
membership of each partner carrier more valuable to customers due to the increased 
opportunities for customers to accumulate and redeem frequent-flyer miles across partner 
carriers.  In other words, the alliance partners’ loyal-customer base in a market is likely to 
expand with a codeshare alliance.  Consistent with this argument, Lederman (2007) provides 
econometric evidence suggesting that enhancements to frequent-flyer partnerships are associated 
with increased demand for partners’ air travel services.  An increase in alliance partners’ loyal-
customer base makes it increasingly difficult for potential entrants to enter the market and amass 
a sufficiently large customer base to make entry profitable.  This increased difficulty that 
potential entrants face to steal customers upon entry, is likely to be reflected as relatively higher 
entry cost to these codeshare markets. 
Via reduced-form econometric regressions, Goetz and Shapiro (2012) empirically test for 
the presence of entry-deterrence motives behind codesharing alliances, and find that an 
incumbent is approximately 25% more likely than average to codeshare when facing the threat of 
entry by low-cost carriers.  However, Goetz and Shapiro (2012) did not investigate whether the 
entry-deterrence effect they found depends on the type of codesharing (Traditional versus 
Virtual) 
5 
employed by incumbent partner airlines.  In addition, they did not fully investigate 
whether the entry-deterrence effect of codesharing depends on the identity of the carrier that is 
threatening to enter the relevant market.  
Previous studies have argued that Southwest Airlines, if not the most formidable LCC in 
U.S. domestic air travel markets, is certainly among the most formidable LCCs in these markets.  
                                                 
4
 Lin (2008) extends this model to consider situations in which an incumbent has a relatively large hub-and-spoke 
network and entry has positive spillover network effects for the incumbent.   
 
5
  In the Definition and Data section of the paper we define and distinguish Traditional and Virtual codesharing. 
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As such, many studies have treated Southwest separately than other LCCs, or focused on 
Southwest as the sole LCC [for example see Morrison (2001), Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), 
Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) among others]. Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) find that the 
presence of potential competition from Southwest reduces fares by 8 percent, while potential 
competition from other LCCs has no fare effect.  Mason and Morrison (2008) find significant 
differences between low-cost carriers in their business models.  Therefore, we are encouraged to 
investigate whether any possible entry-deterrent effect of codesharing depends on whether the 
potential entrant is Southwest versus other low-cost carriers. 
While Goetz and Shapiro (2012) use a reduced-form regression analysis to empirically 
test whether domestic codesharing alliances are motivated by an entry-deterrence purpose, to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no other empirical analysis of this issue.  We believe a structural 
econometric analysis of this issue is needed to take us a step further in examining the evidence 
on this type of strategic behavior by airlines. One advantage of using a structural econometric 
model is that we are able to quantify, in monetary terms, possible market entry barriers 
associated with codesharing.   
Therefore, the main objective of our paper is to use a structural econometric model to 
investigate: (1) whether codesharing between airlines in domestic air travel markets, a form of 
strategic alliance, has a deterrent effect on the entry of potential competitors; (2) whether there is 
a particular type of codesharing among alliance partners that is most effective at deterring entry; 
and (3) whether there is a particular type of airline that seems to be more deterred via such type 
of codesharing between alliance partners.  
To assess the deterrent effect of codesharing on market entry of potential competitors, we 
proceed as follows.  First, we estimate a discrete choice model of air travel demand.  Second, for 
the short-run supply side, we assume that multiproduct airlines set prices for their differentiated 
products according to a Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  The Nash equilibrium price-
setting assumption allows us to derive product-specific markups and use them to compute firm-
level variable profits, which are subsequently used in a dynamic market entry/exit game.  Third, 
we specify a dynamic market entry/exit game played between airlines in which each airline 
chooses markets in which to be active during specific time periods in order to maximize its 
expected discounted stream of profit.  Per-period profit comprises variable profit less per-period 
fixed cost and a one-time entry cost if the airline will serve the relevant market in the next period 
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but not currently serving the market.  The dynamic entry/exit game allows us to estimate fixed 
and entry costs by exploiting previously computed variable profits from the Nash equilibrium 
price-setting game along with observed data on airlines’ decisions to enter and exit certain 
markets.  It is the estimated effect that codesharing between incumbents have on the entry cost of 
potential entrants that allows us to evaluate whether codeshairng has an entry deterrent effect.  
We specify entry cost functions such that we can identify whether or not the extent of 
codesharing by incumbent airlines in a market influences the market entry cost of potential 
entrants, and whether this influence differs by type of potential entrant.  A potential entrant can 
fall into one of three categories: (1) legacy carriers; (2) Southwest Airlines; or (3) other LCCs.  
Since the majority of codesharing in U.S. domestic air travel markets occurs between legacy 
carriers, this implies that our entry cost function specification effectively allows us to explore 
whether codesharing between legacy carriers influences the market entry of: (1) other legacy 
carriers; (2) Southwest Airlines; (3) other LCCs; or some subset of the three carrier types. 
An important aspect of our analysis is that we follow Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle 
(2008) and decompose codesharing into two main types: (1) Traditional Codesharing; and (2) 
Virtual Codesharing.  As such, we are able to investigate whether possible entry deterrent effects 
of codesharing depend on the type of codesharing. 
Our econometric estimates from the entry cost function suggest that more traditional 
codesharing between incumbent carriers in a market puts Southwest at a relative disadvantage to 
enter the market compared to all other potential entrants (legacy carriers and other low-cost 
carriers).  Specifically, each percentage point increase in traditional codeshare products offered 
by incumbents in a market raises market entry cost for Southwest by 0.3%, but reduces market 
entry cost by 0.6% and 0.7% for legacy and other low-cost carriers respectively.  Therefore, 
traditional codesharing by market incumbent carriers has a relative market entry deterrent effect 
on Southwest.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that virtual codesharing has a market entry 
deterrent effect. 
We link the market entry deterrent effects inferred from our entry cost estimates to 
findings from our demand estimates.  Estimates from our demand model suggest that 
incumbents’ traditional codesharing has a larger demand-increasing effect for their products 
compared to virtual codesharing.  Since the demand-side evidence is consistent with the 
argument that traditional codesharing better serves to expand the loyal customer base of market 
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incumbents, then with more traditional codesharing by incumbents, a potential entrant will find it 
more costly (higher market entry cost) to build its own customer base upon entry, making entry 
less profitable in these high traditional codeshare markets.  We argue that this entry deterrent 
effect is binding for Southwest but not for others due to evidence that the vast majority of 
codesharing is done between legacy carriers, and competition between Southwest and legacy 
carriers is stronger than competition between other low-cost carriers and legacy carriers.  For 
example, as pointed out above, Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) provide evidence that 
incumbent legacy carriers do not cut fares in response to potential competition from other low-
cost carriers, but cut fares by 8% in response to potential competition from Southwest. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Next we define and discuss relevant 
concepts and terms used throughout this paper, and describe how we construct the dataset of our 
working sample.  Our econometric model is presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses the 
estimation procedure and summarizes estimation results.  Concluding remarks are offered in 
section 5.  
 2. Definitions and Data 
 2.1 Definitions 
A market is defined as a directional pair of origin and destination cities during a 
particular time period. For example, air travel from New York to Dallas is a different market 
than air travel from Dallas to New York.  Treating markets in a direction-specific manner better 
enables our model to account for the impact that heterogeneity in demographics across origin 
cities has on air travel demand.  
An itinerary is a detailed plan of a journey from an origin to destination city, so it consists 
of one or more flight coupons depending on whether or not intermediate stops are required. Each 
coupon typically represents travel on a particular flight.  Each flight has a ticketing carrier and an 
operating carrier.  The ticketing carrier, or sometimes referred to as the marketing carrier, is the 
airline selling the ticket for the seat, while the operating carrier is the airline whose plane 
actually transports the passenger.  A product is defined as the combination of ticketing carrier, 
operating carrier(s) and itinerary.  
A pure online product has an itinerary whose operating carrier for each flight coupon and 
ticketing carrier are the same. For example, a two-segment ticket with both segments operated 
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and marketed by United Airlines (UA), i.e. (UA/UA → UA/UA).  A flight is said to be 
codeshared when the operating and ticketing carriers for that flight differ. A traditional 
codeshared product is defined as an itinerary that has a single ticketing carrier for the trip, but 
multiple operating carriers, one of which is the ticketing carrier.  For example, a connecting 
itinerary between Continental Airlines (CO) and Delta Airlines (DL), marketed solely by Delta 
(CO/DL → DL/DL) is a traditional codeshared product. A virtual codeshared product is defined 
as an itinerary that has the same operating carrier for all trip segments, but this operating carrier 
differs from the ticketing carrier.  For example, a connecting itinerary operated entirely by 




 2.2 Data 
We use data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the 
Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  The DB1B survey is a 
10% random sample of airline tickets from certified carriers in the United States.  A record in 
this survey represents a ticket.  Each ticket contains information on ticketing and operating 
carriers, origin and destination airports, fare, number of passengers, intermediate airport stops, 
market miles flown on the trip itinerary, nonstop miles between the origin and destination 
airports, and number of market coupons.  Unfortunately, there is no passenger-specific 
information in the data, nor is there any information on ticket restrictions such as advance-
purchase and length-of-stay requirements. 
The data are quarterly, and our study uses data for the entire years of 2005, 2006 and 
2007.  Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others, we select data on air travel 
between the 65 largest US cities. Some of the cities belong to the same metropolitan area and 
have multiple airports.  Table 1.1 reports a list of the cities and the relevant airport groupings we 
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 Additional discussion and examples of pure online, traditional codeshare and virtual codeshare air travel products 
can be found in Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle (2007, 2008 and 2013).  In addition, see Gayle and Brown (2012).   
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Table 1.1 Cites, airports and population 
City, State Airports 
City pop. 
2005 2006 2007 
New York-Newark-Jersey LGA, JFK, EWR 8,726,847  8,764,876  8,826,288  
Los Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,794,640  3,777,502  3,778,658  
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,824,584  2,806,391  2,811,035  
Dallas, TX
a 
DAL, DFW 2,479,896  2,528,227  2,577,723  
Phoenix-Tempe-Mesa, AZ PHX 2,087,948  2,136,518  2,171,495  
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,076,189  2,169,248  2,206,573  
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,517,628  1,520,251  1,530,031  
San Diego, CA SAN 1,284,347  1,294,071  1,297,624  
San Antonio, TX SAT 1,258,733  1,292,082  1,323,698  
San Jose, CA SJC 908,870  918,619  931,344  
Detroit, MI DTW 921,149  918,849  917,234  
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 856,834  869,920  887,796  
Indianapolis, IN IND 789,250  792,619  796,611  
Jacksonville, FL JAX 786,938  798,494  805,325  
San Francisco, CA SFO 777,660  786,149  799,185  
Columbus, OH CMH 738,782  744,473  750,700  
Austin, TX AUS 708,293  730,729  749,120  
Memphis, TN MEM 680,515  682,024  679,404  
Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN MSP 652,481  652,003  656,659  
Baltimore, MD BWI 640,064  640,961  640,150  
Charlotte, NC CLT 631,160  652,202  669,690  
El Paso, TX ELP 587,400  595,980  600,402  
Milwaukee, WI MKE 601,983  602,782  602,656  
Seattle, WA SEA 575,036  582,877  592,647  
Boston, MA BOS 609,690  612,192  622,748  
                            a













Table 1.1 Continued 
Cites, airports and population 
City, State Airports 
City pop. 
2005 2006 2007 
Louisville, KY SDF 559,855  559,709  562,632  
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 582,049  583,978  586,409  
Nashville, TN BNA 579,748  586,327  592,503  
Las Vegas, NV LAS 544,806  552,855  559,892  
Portland, OR PDX 534,112  538,091  546,747  
Oklahoma City, OK OKC 532,006  539,001  545,910  
Tucson, AZ TUS 524,830  530,349  536,752  
Albuquerque, NM ABQ 497,543  508,486  517,162  
Long Beach, CA LGB 467,851  463,723  459,925  
New Orleans, LA MSY 455,188  208,548  288,113  
Cleveland, OH CLE 449,188  442,409  438,068  
Sacramento, CA SMF 448,842  449,658  455,760  
Kansas City, MO MCI 463,983  470,076  475,830  
Atlanta, GA ATL 483,108  498,208  519,569  
Omaha, NE OMA 432,148  437,523  442,452  
Oakland, CA OAK 392,112  392,076  397,441  
Tulsa, OK TUL 381,017  382,394  384,592  
Miami, FL MIA 390,768  412,460  424,662  
Colorado Springs, CO COS 393,804  398,778  399,751  
Wichita, KS ICT 354,524  356,592  360,897  
St Louis, MO STL 352,572  353,837  355,663  
Santa Ana, CA SNA 337,121  334,830  335,491  
Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 553,294  574,065  596,049  
Pittsburgh, PA PIT 316,206  313,306  312,322  
Tampa, FL TPA 325,569  332,604  334,852  
Cincinnati, OH CVG 331,310  332,185  333,321  
Ontario, CA ONT 170,630  170,865  171,603  
Buffalo, NY BUF 277,998  274,740  272,492  
Lexington, KY LEX 278,313  283,324  287,263  
Norfolk, VA ORF 237,487  238,832  236,051  
 
 
We eliminate tickets with nominal prices cheaper than $50 and more expensive than 
$2000, those with multiple ticketing carriers, and those containing more than 2 intermediate 
stops. Within each quarter, a given itinerary-airline(s) combination is repeated many times, each 
time at a different price, making the dataset extremely large.  To make the data more manageable, 
10 
 
we collapse the data based on our definition of product (unique itinerary-airline(s) combination) 
for each quarter.  Before collapsing the data, we aggregated the number of passengers and 
averaged market fare over each defined product. This is the process by which each defined 
product’s quantity and price are constructed.  Products with quantity less than 9 passengers for 
the entire quarter are dropped from the data.
7
  Also, we eliminate monopoly markets, i.e. markets 
in which only one carrier provides products. In the collapsed data set, we have 434,329 
observations (products), each of them unique for each quarter, across 32,680 markets.
 
Other variables that capture air travel product characteristics are created for estimation.  
A measure of product Inconvenience is defined as market miles flown divided by nonstop miles 
between origin and destination. Thus, the minimum value for variable Inconvenience, which is 
equal to 1, implies the most convenient itinerary for a given market.  The dummy variable 
Nonstop is equal to 1 if the product uses a nonstop itinerary.  
We measure the size of an airline's presence at the endpoint cities of a market from 
different perspectives.  The variable Opres_out is a count of the number of different cities that 
the airline offers nonstop flights to, leaving from the origin city.  On the other hand, Opres_in 
counts the number of different cities that the airline provides nonstop flights from, going into the 
origin city of the market.  We also construct a destination presence variable Dpres_out, which 
measures the number of distinct cities that the airline has nonstop flights to, leaving from the 
destination city. 
Opres_out is intended to help explain consumers' choice between airlines at the 
consumer's origin city.  The presumption here is that a consumer is more likely to choose the 
airline that offers nonstop service to more cities from the consumer's origin city.  On the other 
hand, the Opres_in and Dpres_out may better explain an airline's cost of transporting passengers 
in a market.  The argument is that due to possible economies of passenger-traffic density, an 
airline's marginal cost of transporting a passenger in a market is lower as the volume of 
passengers the airline channels through the market increases.  An airline with large measures of 
Opres_in and Dpres_out for a given market, is likely to channel a large volume of passengers 
                                                 
7
 Berry (1992), Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others use a similar, and sometimes more stringent, quantity 




through the market, and therefore is expected to have lower marginal cost of transporting a 
passenger in the market.  
From the collapsed dataset, observed product market shares (subsequently denoted by 
upper case   ) are created by dividing quantity of product   sold (subsequently denoted by   ) by 
the geometric mean of the origin city and destination city populations (subsequently denoted by 
POP), i.e.    
  
   ⁄ .
8
  Traditional Codeshare and Virtual Codeshare are dummy variables 
equal to 1 respectively when the itinerary is identified to be traditional codeshared and virtual 
codeshared.  The variables Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline 
measure the percentage of an airline's products in a market that are traditional codeshare and 
virtual codeshare respectively. 
We only identify codeshare products between major carriers, i.e. following much of the 
literature on airline codesharing, we do not consider products between regional and major 
carriers as codeshare.  For example, a product that involves American Eagle (MQ) and American 
Airlines (AA), where one of them is the ticketing carrier and the other is an operating carrier, is 
still considered by us to be pure online since American Eagle is a regional airline that serves for 
American Airlines. Summary statistics of the variables used for estimation are presented in Table 
1.2.  The variable Fare is measured in constant year 1999 dollars.  We use the consumer price 







                                                 
8
  POP is measured by:     √                                           Due to the fact that population 
magnitudes are significantly larger than quantity sold for any given air travel product, observed product shares, 
computed as described above,  are extremely small numbers.  We therefore scale up all product shares in the data by 
a common factor.  The common factor is the largest integer such that the outside good share (     ∑   
 
   ) in 




Table 1.2 Summary Statistics for the Dataset 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Fare
a 
166.35 52.19 45.08 1,522.46 
Quantity 149.57 508.25 9 11,643 
Opres_out 29.05 28.35 0 177 
Opres_in 29.03 28.30 0 177 
Dpres_out 29.13 28.47 0 177 
Nonstop  0.154 0.36 0 1 
Market miles flown 1,542.34 695.27 67 4,156 
Nonstop miles 1,371.42 648.60 67 2,724 
Inconvenience 1.15 0.21 1 2.975 
Traditional Codeshare 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Virtual Codeshare 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Percent Traditional for Airline 2.04 10.42 0 100 
Percent Virtual for Airline 2.06 9.70 0 100 
Observed Product Shares (Sj) 0.0067 0.02 5.45E-05 0.97 
Number of Products 434,329 
   Number of Markets 32,680       
Notes:  
a 
The variable “Fare” is measured in constant year 1999 dollars. We use the  
consumer price index to deflate “Fare”. 
 
Table 1.3 presents a list of ticketing carriers in the dataset according to type of products 
that each airline provides.  The first two columns show that there are 21 airlines involved in pure 
online products.  All airlines in the dataset provide pure online products. The next two columns 
in Table 1.3 show that, among all airlines in the dataset, 10 are involved in codeshare products 
and 7 of these airlines are the ones we classify as legacy carriers.  The fifth column in Table 1.3 
reports the percent of codeshare products in the sample that each carrier offers for sale to 
consumers. The data in this column reveal that the vast majority (approximately 83 percent) of 
codeshare products are provided by legacy carriers.  
The last column in Table 1.3 reports the percent of each carrier’s codeshare products that 
are codeshared with legacy carriers. Noticeably, almost all of each legacy carrier’s codeshare 
products are codeshared with other legacy carriers, and moreover, ATA and Southwest Airlines, 
which are low-cost carriers, do not codeshare with legacy carriers. An exception to this pattern is 
Frontier Airlines, a low-cost carrier that has 91 percent of its codeshare products codeshared with 
a legacy carrier (typically with Alaska Airlines). However, the previous column shows that 
codeshare products offered by Frontier Airlines only account for 0.07 percent of total codeshare 
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products offered. In summary, the data reveal that a substantial amount of codeshare alliances are 
formed between legacy carriers. 
 
 Table 1.3 List of Airlines in the Dataset  
by Product type they offer to Consumers 
Airlines Involved in  
Pure online Products 
 
  
Airlines that offer  
Codeshare Products to consumers 
Airlines Name Code 
 





Percent of each 
carrier’s codeshare 
products codeshared 
with legacy carriers   
 
  
American Airlines Inc. AA  
 
Legacy Carriers 
   Aloha Airlines AQ  
 
    American Airlines Inc. AA 13.47 98.87 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS  
 
    Alaska Airlines Inc. AS 7.87 100 
JetBlue Airways B6  
 
    Continental Air Lines Inc. CO 5.76 100 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO  
 
    Delta Air Lines Inc. DL 4.76 99.88 
Independence Air DH  
 
    Northwest Airlines Inc. NW 10.03 100 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL  
 
    United Air Lines Inc. UA 28.75 100 
Frontier Airlines Inc. F9  
 
    US Airways Inc. US 12.56 99.82 





 Allegiant Air G4  
 
Low Cost Carriers 
   America West Airlines Inc. HP  
 
    Southwest Airlines Co. WN 9.28 0 
Spirit Air Lines NK  
 
    ATA Airlines  TZ 7.45 0 
Northwest Airlines Inc. NW  
 
    Frontier Airlines Inc. F9 0.07 91.67 










 ATA Airlines  TZ  
     United Air Lines Inc. UA  
     US Airways Inc. US  
     Southwest Airlines Co. WN  
     ExpressJet Airlines Inc. XE  
     Midwest Airlines YX  
     
  
           
Notes:  The carries we classify as Legacy carriers include: American Airline, Alaska Airlines, Continental 
Air, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Air Lines, and US Airways. 
 
Table 1.4 summarizes our data according to the three types of products.  Among 
codeshared products, the number of traditional codeshared products is slightly less than the 
number of virtual codeshared products, but twice as many passengers travel on virtual 




Table 1.4 Classification of Cooperative Agreement in Data Set 
Classification 
Observations/Products   Passengers 
Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent 
Pure online 416,537  95.90  
 
64,150,292  98.75  
Traditional Codeshare 8,847  2.04  
 
254,065  0.39  
Virtual Codeshare 8,945  2.06  
 
558,095  0.86  
Total 434,329  100.00    64,962,452  100.00  
 
As we explain in subsequent sections of the paper, the short-run demand and supply sides 
of the model are estimated using the data at the product-market-time period level, while the 
dynamic entry/exit model is estimated using the data aggregated up to the airline-market-time 
period level.  Since the data contain many more airlines than the dynamic entry/exit model can 
feasibly handle, at the stage of estimating the dynamic model, we impose additional restrictions 
to be able to estimate the dynamic model.  A restrictive assumption we make is that a set of the 
airlines in our data can reasonably be lumped into an “Other low-cost carriers” category and 
treated as if the “Other low-cost carriers” is a single carrier.  Similar to many studies in the 
literature [e.g. Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012), Morrison (2001) among others], Southwest 
Airlines is the low-cost carrier that we treat separately than other low-cost carriers.  So the 
“Other low-cost carriers” category includes all low-cost carriers except Southwest Airlines.  
By using the number of passengers as a threshold to define whether or not an airline is 
active in a market, we are able to identify the number of markets that each airline has entered and 
exited. We define an airline to be active in a directional origin-destination market during a 
quarter if at least 130 passengers travel on products offered for sale by the airline in this market 
during the quarter.
9
  Each airline's market entry and exit decisions contained in the data are 
crucial for us to be able to estimate fixed and entry costs, since the dynamic entry/exit model 
relies on the optimality assumption that potential entrants will only enter a market if the one-time 
entry cost is less than the expected discounted future stream of profits, and an incumbent will 
exit a market when per-period fixed cost becomes sufficiently high relative to per-period variable 
profits such that the expected discounted future stream of profits is non-positive.  Therefore, it is 
useful to get a sense of the extent to which the data contain information relevant for identifying 
                                                 
9
 Our passenger threshold of 130 for a directional market is equivalent to the 260 for non-directional market used by 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012).  
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fixed and entry costs from the dynamic model.  Table 1.5 reports the number of market entry and 
exit events by airline.  The table shows that each airline has several market entry and exit events, 
but most airlines have more market entry than market exit events, and overall there are 
substantially more entry than exit events.  This suggests that we might be better able to identify 
entry cost than fixed cost. 
 
 
Table 1.5 Number of market entry and exit events by airline  
Airlines 
 
Number of market entry 
events Number of market exit events 
American Airlines Inc. 498 332 
Continental Air Lines Inc. 372 303 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 348 360 
Northwest Airlines Inc. 323 309 
United Air Lines Inc. 316 259 
US Airways Inc. 655 151 
Alaska Airlines Inc. 22 12 
Southwest Airlines Co. 262 105 
Other low cost carriers  368 625 
Overall 3,164 2,456 
 
 3. Model 
 3.1 Demand 
Demand is modeled using a nested logit model.  There are POP potential consumers, who 
may either buy one of J air travel products, j = 1,…,J, or otherwise choose the outside good 
(good 0), e.g. driving, taking a train, or not traveling at all.  The nested logit model classifies 
products into G groups, and one additional group for the outside good.  Products within the same 
group are closer substitutes than products from different groups.  Groups are defined by ticketing 
carriers in this study, so products with the same ticketing carrier belong to the same group.  The 
indirect utility of consumer c from purchasing product j is given by: 
             (   )   
  (1) 
16 
 
The first term,    , is the mean valuation for product j, common to all consumers. The 
mean valuation of product j depends on its price,   , a vector    of observed characteristics of 
product j, and error term    reflecting unobserved (to researchers) product characteristics: 
       
          (2) 
where    and    are parameters to be estimated. 
The second term in equation (1),    , is a random component of utility that is common to 
all products belonging to group g.  The term    
  is consumer c’s unobserved utility, specific to 
product j.  The parameter   lies between 0 and 1 and measures the correlation of the consumers’ 
utility across products belonging to the same group. The correlation of preferences increases as   
approaches 1.  At the other extreme, if    , there is no correlation of preferences: consumers 
are equally likely to switch to products in a different group as to products in the same group in 
response to a price increase.  
The nested logit model assumes that the random terms     and    
   have distributions 
such that       (   )   
  have the extreme value distribution. Normalizing the mean utility 
level for outside good to 0, i.e.,     , the probability that a consumer chooses product j is as 
follows: 
    
    (
  





   
  ∑   
    
   
 (3) 
where    ∑     
  
   
     .  The total quantity sold of product j,   , is simply specified to equal 
to the probability that a potential consumer chooses product j times the total number of potential 
consumers, POP: 
      (       
 )      (4) 
where   (       ) is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. 
 3.2 Supply 
The ticketing carrier of a codeshare product markets and sets the final price for the round-
trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for operating services provided.  Unfortunately 
for researchers, partner airlines do not publicize details of how they compensate each other on 
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their codeshare flights.  Therefore, our challenge as researchers is to specify a modeling 
approach that captures our basic understanding of what is commonly known about how a 
codeshare agreement works without imposing too much structure on a contracting process about 
which we have few facts.  As such, we follow the modeling approach outlined in Chen and 
Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013). 
Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013) suggest that for modeling purposes a codeshare 
agreement can be thought of as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners (   ), 
where   is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for 
transporting the passenger, while   represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners 
that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  For the purposes of this paper we do not 
need to econometrically identify an equilibrium value of  , but in describing the dynamic part of 
the model, we do show where   enters the model. 
Suppose the final price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential price-
setting game, where in the first stage of the sequential process the operating carrier sets price,  , 
for transporting a passenger using its own plane(s), and privately makes this price known to its 
partner ticketing carrier.  In the second stage, conditional on the agreed upon price   for services 
supplied by the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the final round-trip price    for the 
codeshare product.  The final subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played between 
ticketing carriers, and produces the final ticket prices observed by consumers. 
Each ticketing carrier   solves the following profit maximization problem: 
    
    
         
    
[ ∑ (          )    
      
] (5) 
where       is the variable profit carrier   obtains in market m during period t by offering the set 
of products      to consumers,       is the quantity of tickets for product j sold in market m, 
     is the price of product j, and       is the effective marginal cost incurred by ticketing 
carrier    from offering product j.  
 Let         index the corresponding operating carriers.  If product   is a traditional 
codeshare product, then           
      
 
, where     
  is the marginal cost that ticketing 
carrier   incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services on some segment(s) of 
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the trip needed for product  , while     
 
 is the price ticketing carrier   pays to operating carrier   
for its transportation services on the remaining trip segment(s).  If instead product   is a virtual 
codeshare product, then           
 
, where     
 
 is the price the ticketing carrier pays to 
operating carrier   for its exclusive transportation services in the provision of product  .10  Last, 
if product   is a pure online product, then          
 .  In the case of a pure online product, the 
ticketing carrier is also the sole operating carrier of product  , i.e.,    . 
 In equilibrium, the amount of product   an airline sells is equal to the quantity demanded, 
that is,          (       
 )     .  The optimization problem in (5) yields the following 
set of J first-order conditions – one for each of the J products in the market:  
 
 ∑(      )
   
   
   
    
                    (6) 
We have dropped the market and time subscripts in equation (6) only to avoid a clutter of 
notation.  The set of first-order conditions can be represented in matrix notation as follows:  
 (    )  (    )      (7) 
where p, mc, and s are J×1 vectors of product prices, marginal costs, and predicted product 
shares respectively, Ω is a J×J matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that capture 
ticketing carriers’ “ownership” structure of the J products in a market,    is the operator for 
element-by-element matrix multiplication, and Δ is a J×J matrix of own and cross-price effects, 
where element     
   
   
.  Since for purposes of the model the ticketing carrier is considered the 
“owner” of a product, in the discussion that follows, “airline” is synonymous with ticketing 
carrier. 
Equation (7) can be re-arranged to yield a vector of product markups: 
     (      )        (    )     (8) 
Based on equations (5) and (8), and with estimates of demand parameters in hand,   ̂, firm-level 
variable profit can be recovered by:  
                                                 
10
 The implicit assumption here is that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs fixed expenses 
in marketing the product to potential passengers. 
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       ∑        (     
 ̂)    
      
 (9) 
 3.3 Dynamic Entry/Exit Game 
In the dynamic entry/exit game, each airline chooses markets in which to be active during 
specific time periods.  An airline being active in a market means that the airline actually sells 
products to consumers in the market even though a subset of those products may use the 
operating services of the airline’s codeshare partner carriers.  Each airline optimally makes this 
decision in order to maximize its expected discounted stream of profit:  
   (∑  
        
 
   
) (10) 
where   (   ) is the discount factor, and          is the per-period profit of airline   in origin-
destination market m.  Airline i’s per-period profit is: 
 
                            (11) 
where       represents the variable profit of airline i in origin-destination market m  during 
period t that is computed from the previously discussed differentiated products Nash price-
setting game;         is a zero-one indicator that equals 1 only if airline i had made the decision 
in period t-1 to be active in market m during period t, therefore        only if airline i makes 
decision in period t to be active in market m during period t+1; and      is the sum of fixed and 
entry costs of airline i in market m during period t.   
Let      be specified as: 
                 
   (         )[         
        
         
  ] (12) 
where       represents the deterministic part of per-period fixed cost of operating flights in 
origin-destination market m. The component     
   represents a private firm-idiosyncratic shock to 
airline i’s fixed cost.  The fixed cost           
   is paid now only if the airline decides to be 
active in market m next period, i.e., if       .   
 The entry cost          
        
         
   has four components;       is a 
deterministic component, while    
    ,    
    , and     
   represent shocks to entry cost. Shocks 
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     and    
     only vary by market and time and are observed by firms, but not by us the 
researchers, while     
   represents a private firm-idiosyncratic shock to airline i’s entry cost.  The 
entry cost is paid only when the airline is not active in market m at period t but it decides to be 
active in the market next period, i.e., if           and       . 
 Let the composite private firm-idiosyncratic shock to airline i’s fixed and entry costs be 
denoted by     .  Based on equation (12),          
   (         )    
  .  We assume that the 
composite private information shock,     , is independently and identically distributed over 
firms, markets and time, and has a type 1 extreme value  probability distribution function. 
The deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs are specified as: 
 
         
     
          (13) 
 
          
     
                           
                  
   
                      
                
             
                             
   
                          
   
                              
(14) 
where         is the mean across size-of-presence variables Opres_in and Dpres_out for airline 
i at the endpoint cities of market m; 
11
                is the percent of products in market m 
during period t that are traditional codeshare;                   is the percent of products in 
market m during period t that are virtual codeshare; Southwest is a zero-one dummy variable that 
equals to one only if the airline is Southwest;           is a zero-one dummy variable that 
equals to one for low-cost carriers other than Southwest; and 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    is the set of structural parameters to be 
estimated. 
               and                  measure the extent of codesharing that takes 
place in a market.  While we do not explicitly model airlines' optimizing decision of whether or 
                                                 
11
 As we previously defined in the section, Definitions and Data, Opres_in is a variable that counts the number of 
different cities that the airline provides nonstop flights from, going into the origin city of the market, while variable 




not to codeshare in a market, it is reasonable to conjecture that this optimizing decision is 
influenced by the effective cost an airline faces to use its own planes to begin providing service 
in the market (part of its market entry cost).  This further suggests that shocks to market entry 
cost that are unobserved to us,    
     and    
    , are likely to influence                and 
                  respectively.  As such, we formally specify the following equations: 
                       
                                            (15) 
                          
                                            (16) 
where     is a matrix of variables that influence the extent of traditional and virtual codesharing 
that takes place in a market;    and   are vectors of parameters associated with these variables in 
equations (15) and (16) respectively; while    
     and    
     are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed normal random variables with mean zero and standard deviations       
and       respectively.  Therefore, the model accounts for the endogeneity of variables 
               and                   in the entry cost function.   
The variables we include in     are: (1) the geometric mean of the origin city and 
destination city populations (POP), which is a measure of market size; (2) nonstop flight 
distance between the origin and destination; (3) one-period lag of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) computed based on the relative sizes of airlines' presence at the market endpoint 
cities, where an airline's size of city presence is measured by the previously defined variables, 
Opres_in and Dpres_out; 
12
 (4) origin city fixed effects; (5) destination city fixed effects; and (6) 
quarter fixed effects. 
The set of structural parameters in the dynamic model to be estimated is (     ) where: 
      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    . (17) 
  
   measures mean (across airlines, markets and time) fixed cost, while    
   measures the effect 
that size of an airline's city presence has on fixed cost.  The mean recurrent fixed cost parameter 
  
   may comprise fixed expenses incurred by a ticketing carrier when the carrier markets a 
codeshare product to potential consumers.  In our previous discussion we define (   ) as a 
privately negotiated codeshare contract between partner carriers, where   is a per-passenger 
                                                 
12
 Opres_in is a variable that counts the number of different cities that the airline provides nonstop flights from, 
going into the origin city of the market, while variable Dpres_out counts the number of distinct cities that the airline 
has nonstop flights to, leaving from the destination city. 
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price the ticketing carrier pays an operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while   
represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners that determines how the joint surplus 
is distributed.  It was shown that   enters the effective marginal cost of the ticketing carrier.  
However, the lump-sum transfer between partners,  , is nested in   
  , but we do not attempt to 
separately identify   since knowing its value is not essential for the purposes of our paper. 
    
   measures mean (across airlines, markets and time) entry cost – we also allow mean 
entry cost to differ by the three carrier-types we consider (Legacy, Southwest and Other low cost 
carriers), in which case   
   would be a vector containing three parameters;   
   measures the 
effect that size of an airline's city presence has on entry cost;   
   and   
   respectively measure 
the impact that traditional and virtual codesharing between incumbent airlines have on market 
entry costs of legacy carriers that are potential entrants to the relevant market, that is 
         
             
   
    and 
         
                
   
  ;   
   and   
   measure the respective differential 
impacts that traditional and virtual codesharing between incumbent airlines have on market entry 
cost of Southwest when it is a potential entrant to the relevant market, relative to the entry cost 
impacts that these two types of codesharing have on potential entrants that are legacy carriers, 
that is 
            
             
 
         
             
   
    and 
            
                
 
         
                
   
  ; while 
  
   and   
   measure the respective differential impacts that traditional and virtual codesharing 
between incumbent airlines have on market entry cost of other low-cost carriers that are potential 
entrants to the relevant market, relative to the entry cost impacts that these two types of 
codesharing have on potential entrants that are legacy carriers, that is 
            
             
 
         
             
   
    and  
            
                
 
         
                
   
  .  For example, if   
    , 
then we can infer that traditional codesharing between incumbent carriers raises Southwest’s 
entry cost to the relevant market, relative to the change in entry cost of potential entrant legacy 
carriers.  Likewise, if   
    , then we can infer that traditional codesharing between incumbent 
carriers raises other low-cost carriers’ entry cost to the relevant market, relative to the change in 
entry cost of potential entrant legacy carriers.   
Our specified equations do not include a firm-specific component of fixed cost and entry 
cost for two reasons. First, estimation of the dynamic model is computationally quite intensive, 
and convergence is difficult to achieve when the number of parameters being optimized over is 
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large.  Even with the model restricted to 10 parameters and four quarters of data, optimization 
took approximately seven days of continuously running the computer program.  Second, even 
without firm-specific parameters, the fixed and entry cost functions do capture some 
heterogeneity across firms via the firm-specific variable        . 
 Reducing the dimensionality of the dynamic game 
From the previously discussed Nash price-setting game, firm-level variable profit is: 
     (     
 )  ∑        (           
 )      .  Let 
     
               (18) 
Note that (x, ξ) are state variables that are needed in the dynamic entry/exit game.  As pointed 
out and discussed in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012),     
  aggregates these state variables in an 
economically meaningful way so that these state variables can enter the dynamic game through 
    
 . Therefore, Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) recommend treating     
  as a firm-specific state 
variable, rather than treating x and ξ as separate state variables. This innovation substantially 
reduces the dimensionality of the state space.  The payoff-relevant information of firm i in 
market m is: 
 
     
                     
                                              
        
     . 
(19) 
where             . 
Each airline has its own vector of state variables,     , and airlines take into account 
these variables when making decisions. So it might seem that each airline does not take into 
account the strategies that other airlines adopt.  However, an airline’s vector of state variables, 
    , depends on previous period entry and exit decisions of other airlines. For example, the 
variable profit state variable,     
 , depends on competition from other incumbents currently in 
the market, which implies that this state variable depends on the previous period’s entry/exit 
decisions of other airlines. Accordingly, our entry/exit model incorporates dynamic strategic 
interactions among airlines. 
Let       (         )                       be a set of strategy functions, 
one for each airline.    is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) if the profile of strategies in   
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maximizes the expected value of airline i at every state (         )  given the opponent’s 
strategy. 
 Value Function and Bellman Equation 
For notational convenience, we drop the market subscript. Let   
 (      ) be the value 
function for airline i given that the other airlines behave according to their respective strategies 
in  . The value function is the unique solution to the Bellman equation: 
 
  
 (      )     
         
    
 (      )          
  ∫  
 (          )    (     )  
 (           )  
(20) 
where    
 (      ) and   
 (           ) are the expected one-period profit and expected transition 
of state variables, respectively, for airline i given the strategies of the other airlines. The profile 
of strategies in   is a MPE if, for every airline i and every state (      ), we have: 
 
  (      )        
   
    
 (      )          
  ∫  
 (          )    (     )  
 (           )  
(21) 
The transition rules we use for state variables are described in Appendix A.  In Appendix B we 
illustrate that the MPE can also be represented as a vector of conditional choice probabilities 
(CCPs) that solves the fixed point problem    (   ) , where 
     ( )                          (   )       (   )  is a vector of best response 
probability mapping, where  ( ) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution. 
 4. Estimation and Results 
 4.1 Estimation of demand 
It is well-known in the empirical industrial organization literature that in case of the 
nested logit model, the demand equation to be estimated takes the following linear functional 
form [see Berry (1994)]:  
   (  )    (  )     
          (    )     (22) 
where    is the observed share of product j,     is the share of the outside alternative for the 
market, and      is the observed product share within group g. 
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Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline are two of the non-price 
product characteristic variables in   .  Recall that variables Percent Traditional for Airline and 
Percent Virtual for Airline measure the percentage of an airline's products in a market that are 
traditional codeshare and virtual codeshare respectively.  Since airlines optimally choose the 
extent to which to codeshare with others in a market, it is possible that these codeshare variables 
are correlated with shocks to demand captured in   , making Percent Traditional for Airline and 
Percent Virtual for Airline endogenous in the demand equation.  In addition, it is well-known 
that    and   (    ) are correlated with   .  Therefore, our estimation of the demand equation 
takes into account the endogeneity of   ,   (    ), Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent 
Virtual for Airline.  Specifically, we find instruments for these four variables and use two-stage-
least squares (2SLS) to estimate the demand equation. 
 Instruments for endogenous variables in demand equation 
To obtain valid instruments for price and within group product share, we exploit the fact 
that the menu of products offered by airlines in a market is predetermined at the time of shocks 
to demand.  Furthermore, the non-price characteristics of an airline’s products are primarily 
determined by the route network structure of the airline, and unlike price and within group 
product share, this network structure is not routinely and easily changed during a short period of 
time, which mitigates the influence of demand shocks on the menu of products offered and their 
associated non-price characteristics. 
The instruments we use for product price are: (1) number of competing products offered 
by other carriers with equivalent number of intermediate stops; (2) the squared deviation of a 
product’s itinerary distance from the average itinerary distance of competing products offered by 
other airlines; (3) the number of other products offered by an airline in a market; (4) itinerary 
distance; and (5) the interaction between jet fuel price
13
 and itinerary distance.  The inclusion of 
these instruments is motivated by supply theory, which predicts that the price of a product will 
be influenced by changes in its markup and marginal cost.   
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The rationale for instruments (1) and (2) is that they are measures of the degree of 
competition that a product faces, which affects the size of a product’s markup.  Next, it is 
reasonable to assume that a multiproduct airline jointly sets the prices of its products in the 
market.  Standard oligopoly theory tells us that the more substitutable products are, they will be 
priced higher if they are jointly priced by a single firm compared to if they are separately priced 
by different firms.  This rationale leads us to believe that instrument (3) is correlated with 
product markup, and by extension product price.  Instruments (4) and (5) should affect an 
airline's marginal cost of providing the product, which in turn influences the price of the product. 
To instrument the log of within group product share,   (    ), we use the mean number 
of intermediate stops across products offered by an airline in a market.  The rationale is that such 
an instrument is likely associated with passengers’ preference for products offered by one airline 
relative to the products offered by another.    
For the variables Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline, we 
adopt two instruments: (i) one-period lag of the squared deviation of an airline’s size presence at 
the market endpoint cities from the average size presence of other airlines at the market 
endpoints; and (ii) the interaction of (i) with nonstop flight distance.  The size of an airline's 
presence at the market endpoints is computed by averaging across variables Opres_in and 
Dpres_out, which are variables we defined in the Definitions and Data section.  An airline's 
measures of Opres_in and Dpres_out at the endpoints of a market are more determined by the 
airline's extended route network structure rather than features of the given origin-destination 
market.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Opres_in and Dpres_out are uncorrelated with 
  .  In addition, lower presence for an airline at the endpoints of a market makes it more likely 
that the airline will codeshare with others that are already serving the market.  So Opres_in and 
Dpres_out are in principle good instruments for Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent 
Virtual for Airline.  Last, we allow the influence of an airline's size of presence at the market 
endpoints on its extent of market codesharing to depend on the nonstop flight distance of the 
market.  This explains the rationale for instrument (ii). 
 4.2 Results from demand estimation 
We estimate the demand equation using both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two-
stage Least Squares (2SLS).  The demand regression results are presented in Table 1.6.  First, 
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focusing on the coefficient estimates for variables Fare and ln(Sj/g), we find that even though the 
signs of these coefficients in both OLS and 2SLS regressions are consistent with intuition, there 
are large differences in the size of the coefficient estimates when compared across the OLS and 
2SLS regressions. Even more contrasting, are the OLS versus the 2SLS coefficient estimates on 
variables Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline.  This preliminary 
evidence suggests that estimates in the OLS regression are biased and inconsistent and thus 
instruments are needed for these endogenous variables.   
To formally confirm that variables Fare, ln(Sj/g), Percent Traditional for Airline and 
Percent Virtual for Airline are endogenous, we perform a Hausman exogeneity test.  The result 
of the Hausman test shown in Table 1.6 easily rejects the exogeneity of these four variables at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  As a check on the validity of instruments used for 
the 2SLS regression, we estimate first-stage reduced-form regressions for each of the 
endogenous variables.  When Fare is the dependent variable in the reduced-form regression, R-
squared is 0.32, but when ln(Sj/g) is the dependent variable R-squared is 0.56.  When Percent 
Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline are dependent variables, the R-squared 
values are respectively 0.61 and 0.51.  Hence, the following discussion of demand regression 
results in Table 1.6 is based on 2SLS estimates. 
Since coefficient estimates are all statistically significant at conventional levels of 
statistical significance, the remainder of the discussion focuses on the signs of the coefficient 
estimates. As expected, the coefficient estimate on Fare is negative, implying that higher prices 
are associated with lower levels of utility.  In other words, all else equal, passengers prefer 
cheaper air travel products.  
The coefficient estimate on Opres_out is positive.  This result is consistent with our 
priors, and suggests that travelers prefer to fly with airlines, all else equal, that offer services to 
more destinations from the travelers’ origin city.  This estimated effect is possibly in part due to 
the benefits of frequent-flyer programs.  Travelers are more likely to hold frequent-flyer 
membership with the airline they think they are most likely to use in the future, and it is 
reasonable for a passenger to conjecture that they will most often use the airline that offers 
service to a relatively large number of destinations from the passenger’s origin city.  Once the 
passenger becomes invested in the airline’s frequent-flyer program, this helps reinforce the 




Table 1.6 Demand Estimation  
  OLS   2SLS 
Variables Estimates Std. Error   Estimates Std. Error 
Fare -0.0004*** 2.96E-05 
 
-0.0094*** 0.0002 
ln(Sj/g) 0.4925*** 0.0012 
 
0.0672*** 0.0047 
Opres_out 0.0114*** 0.0001 
 
0.0064*** 0.0002 
Nonstop 1.1147*** 0.0059 
 
1.4223*** 0.0119 
Inconvenience -0.9144*** 0.0067 
 
-0.8404*** 0.0123 
Traditional Codeshare -0.3232*** 0.0124 
 
-8.2078*** 0.3781 
Virtual Codeshare -0.5009*** 0.0132 
 
-7.4341*** 0.2327 
Percent Traditional for Airline -0.0023*** 0.0002  0.1487*** 0.0075 
Percent Virtual for Airline -0.0084*** 0.0002  0.1335*** 0.0047 
Spring  0.1421*** 0.0038 
 
0.1400*** 0.0076 
Summer 0.1065*** 0.0038 
 
0.1159*** 0.0075 
Fall 0.0857*** 0.0038 
 
0.0744*** 0.0074 
Constant -4.2022*** 0.0180  -3.4225*** 0.0424 
Ticketing carrier fixed effects YES 
 
YES 
Year fixed effects YES 
 
YES 
Market Origin fixed effects YES 
 
YES 






Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 
  
58663.8***     p = 0.0000 
Robust regression F test: 20168.2***     p = 0.0000 
  
        *** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
 
 
The coefficient estimate on Nonstop is positive, implying that consumers prefer nonstop 
flights between their origin and destination compared to travel itineraries that require 
intermediate stops.  This is reasonable since passengers should prefer the most convenient travel 
itinerary from origin to destination.  In addition, the coefficient estimate on Inconvenience is 
negative.  This intuitively makes sense as well since passengers prefer the most direct route to 
the destination. 
The Traditional Codeshare dummy variable has a negative coefficient estimate, implying 
that a traditional codeshare product makes passengers’ utility lower relative to a pure online 
product.  A likely reason is that the flight itinerary for a pure online product is typically very 
streamlined because an airline can better organize its own flights and schedules to minimize 
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layover time, as well as efficiently organize its own gates at airports.  Even though codeshare 
partners try to streamline flights across carriers to minimize layover times and facilitate smoother 
connections, the negative coefficient estimate on the Traditional Codeshare variable suggests 
that this process has not achieved parity with pure online products [Gayle (2013)]. 
The Virtual Codeshare dummy variable has a negative coefficient estimate as well.  This 
result suggests that passengers perceive virtual codeshare products as inferior substitutes to pure 
online products.  For the itineraries that include virtual segments, first-class upgrades using 
accumulated frequent-flyer miles are not usually available [Ito and Lee (2007)]. This could 
explain why passengers perceive virtual codeshare products as inferior to pure online products.  
Note that the coefficient estimates on both Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent 
Virtual for Airline are positive, suggesting that consumers tend to choose the airlines that have a 
higher percentage of their products being codeshared.  This result is consistent with the argument 
that airline codesharing has a demand-increasing effect [Gayle and Brown (2012)].  The rationale 
for a demand-increasing effect is due to the fact that codeshare partners typically make their 
frequent-flyer programs reciprocal, thus allowing travelers holding frequent-flyer membership 
with one partner carrier to accumulate frequent-flyer points when flying with any partner carrier 
in the alliance.  Thus the new opportunities for travelers to accumulate frequent-flyer points 
across partner carriers can increase demand for the codeshare partners' products.   
It is worth noting that the coefficient estimate on Percent Traditional for Airline is larger 
than the coefficient estimate on Percent Virtual for Airline, suggesting that traditional 
codesharing may have a larger impact on increasing demand relative to virtual codesharing.  This 
result makes sense since traditional codesharing requires that partner carriers’ route networks are 
complementary, while virtual codesharing does not.  In the situations where partner carriers’ 
route networks are complementary, and therefore require passengers to fly on separate partner 
carriers’ planes to complete a trip, there are greater opportunities for passengers to accumulate 
frequent-flyer miles from the partner's reciprocal frequent-flyer programs.  In other words, 
frequent-flyer membership with a partner carrier is likely more valuable to customers when 
partner carriers’ route networks are complementary.  To the best of our knowledge, this formal 
evidence suggesting that traditional codesharing may have a larger impact on increasing demand 
relative to virtual codesharing has not been previously investigated in the literature.  So this is a 
new result, which may also help explain some key results from the dynamic model.     
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The coefficient on ln(Sj/g) is  , measuring the correlation of consumers’ preferences for 
products offered for sale by the same airline.  Our estimate of   is 0.067.  Given that we nest 
products by airlines and   is statistically significant, this suggests that passengers’ choice 
behavior shows some amount of brand-loyalty to airlines.  However, since the estimate of   is 
closer to zero than it is to one, then this brand-loyal behavior is not very strong.  
The demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity estimate of -1.62.  As pointed out 
by Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986) and Brander and Zhang (1990), a reasonable range for own-
price elasticity in the airline industry is from -1.2 to -2.0.  Peters (2006) study of the airline 
industry yields own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6.  Berry and Jia (2010) 
find own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their year 2006 sample, while 
Gayle and Wu (2012) find own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -1.65 to -2.39 in their year 
2010 sample.  Therefore, we are satisfied that the elasticity estimates generated from our model 
are reasonable and consistent with evidence in the existing literature.  
 As revealed by equation (8), the demand parameter estimates in Table 1.6 can be 
combined with the short-run supply-side Nash equilibrium price-setting assumption to compute 
product markups. Overall, mean price is $166.35, while the computed mean product markup is 
$109.03.  We also use the demand estimates along with equations (8) and (9) to compute 
quarterly market-level variable profits by airline.  As we stated previously in the data section of 
the paper, the original database, before any cleaning, is only a 10% random sample of air travel 
tickets sold.  This implies that the magnitudes of our variable profit estimates are at most roughly 
10% of actual variable profits.  Variable profits are measured in constant year 1999 dollars.  
Overall, an airline's mean quarterly market-level variable profit is $82,775.43, while the median 
is $31,492.71.   
 4.3 Estimation of Dynamic Model 
The likelihood function for the dynamic model is given by, 
 (     )  
∏ ∏ ∏  (     ̃   
   ̃   
     
        
      ) (   
          ) (   
          )
 
   
 
   
 
      (23) 
 
where     (                )  is the vector of market participation actions taken by 
airlines in period t.  Note that the likelihood function is comprised of three parts.  The first part, 
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 (     ̃   
   ̃   
     
        
      )  computes the conditional likelihood of observing the logit 
choice probabilities of airlines being active in markets across the sample during the time span of 
the data.  To obtain the full unconditional likelihood, we multiply the conditional likelihood by 
the probabilities of observing specific values of     
     and    
    , where 
   
                         and     
                             based on 
equations (15) and (16).  Since we assume that    
     and    
     are normally distributed random 
variables with zero means and standard deviations       and       respectively, then  ( ) is the 
normal probability density function. 
 While joint estimation of the full set of parameters (     ) is desirable due to potential 
efficiency gains, such joint estimation is extremely computationally demanding in this dynamic 
model.  Fortunately, a convenient feature of the likelihood function above is that each of the 
three vectors of parameters in (     ) is identified by separate parts of the likelihood function.  
Specifically,  (     ̃   
   ̃   
     
        
      ) is the part that identifies parameters in vector  , 
while   (   
          ) and  (   
          ) are the parts that identify parameter vectors   and   
respectively.  This implies that parameter vectors   and   can be separately estimated in a first 
step using likelihood functions ∏ ∏  (   
          )
 
   
 
    and ∏ ∏  (   
          )
 
   
 
    
respectively.  Given estimates  ̂ and  ̂, we can compute  (   
          ̂) and  (   
          ̂) 
and use them to construct the relevant parts of  (   ̂  ̂) in order to estimate  ̂ in a second step.  
Based on the discussion above, we use the following pseudo log likelihood function to 
estimate parameters in vector  : 
 
 (     ̂  ̂)  ∑ ∑∑{      [ ( ̃   
     ̃   
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 (      )  [ (  ̃   
     ̃   
 )]    [ (   
          ̂)]
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          ̂)]} 
(24) 
where  (     ̂  ̂) is called a “pseudo” log likelihood function because airlines’ conditional 
choice probabilities (CCPs) in  ( )  are arbitrary and do not represent the equilibrium 
probabilities associated with  , where   is the vector of parameters in the fixed and entry cost 
functions previously specified in equations (13) and (14).  Since the focus now is describing how 
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  is estimated, in what follows we drop  ̂  and  ̂  when discussing “pseudo” log likelihood 
function  ( ) only for notational convenience.       
 We begin by implementing the Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimation 
procedure [Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012)].  The PML requires two steps.  In step 1, we estimate 
relevant state transition equations.  Appendix A describes transition rules used for state variables.  
In addition, nonparametric estimates of the choice probabilities   ̂ are computed in step1.  These 
nonparametric probability estimates, along with state variables and estimated state transition 
probabilities, are used to compute  ̃   
  ̂  and  ̃   
  ̂  as described in Appendix B.  Using  ̃   
  ̂  and 
 ̃   
  ̂ , we are able to construct the pseudo log likelihood function,  (    ̂).  In step 2 of the PML 
estimation algorithm, the vector of parameters  ̂    is estimated by: 
  ̂          
 
 (    ̂) (25) 
This PML algorithm is simple and does not require solving for an equilibrium in the 
dynamic game, and thus substantially reduces computational burden.  However, the two-step 
pseudo maximum likelihood estimator  ̂    can have a large finite sample bias [Aguirregabiria 
and Mira (2007)].  To achieve consistency of the parameter estimates, we follow Aguirregabiria 
and Mira (2002, 2007) and use as a starting point the PML parameter estimates along with the 
non-parametric estimates of the choice probabilities to implement the Nested Pseudo Likelihood 
(NPL) estimation algorithm.  We describe the NPL estimation algorithm in Appendix C.
14
  
 Results from first-stage estimation of parameter vectors   and   
Table 1.7 reports the estimation results for first-stage estimation of parameter vectors   
and  .  The results suggest that more concentrated airline presence at the market endpoints 
(measured by variable Lag HHI of Presence), and longer distance between market endpoints 
(measured by variable Nonstop Flight Distance) seem to incentivize relatively higher levels of 
traditional codesharing, but lower levels of virtual codesharing.  At a minimum we can infer 
                                                 
14
 While the demand model is estimated using all three years in the data set (2005, 2006 and 2007), due to 
significant computational burden, we find that the dynamic entry/exit model can only feasibly be estimated using, at 
most, four quarters of the data.  We only use data in year 2005 when estimating the dynamic entry/exit model.  Even 
with just four quarters of data, the computer code for the dynamic entry/exit model took more than seven days of 
continuous running before convergence is achieved. 
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from these results that airlines' choice of what type of codesharing to employ in a market 
depends in part on certain market characteristics.   Last, results of F-tests shown in the table 
suggest that all regressors as a group do explain variations in                and 
                 .  
 
Table 1.7 Estimation of Linear Equations  



















POP -2.84E-08 2.32E-07 1.37E-07 2.35E-07 
Nonstop flight distance 0.0016*** 7.68E-05 -0.0012*** 7.79E-05 
Lag HHI of Presence 0.9831** 0.4001 -3.6714*** 0.4056 
Constant -1.5868*** 0.4384 2.6997*** 0.4444 
Origin fixed effects YES YES 
Destination fixed effects YES YES 
Quarter fixed effects YES YES 
R-squared 0.2421 0.2943 
F-test 29.60     Prob>F = 0.000 38.63   Prob>F = 0.000 
               *** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
               **   indicates statistical significance at 5% 




 4.4 Results from the dynamic model 
Table 1.8 reports estimates of parameters in the fixed and entry cost functions from the 
dynamic model.  The quarterly discount factor, β, is fixed at 0.99 (that implies an annual 
discount factor of 0.96).  All the estimated fixed and entry cost parameters are measured in ten 
thousands of annual 1999 dollars.  
First, point estimates of parameters in the fixed cost function are unreasonably small and 
imprecisely estimated.  As such, we cannot draw reliable inferences about the size of fixed cost.  
Fortunately, based on the objectives of our study we are most interested in parameter estimates in 
the entry cost function, which is where we now focus the remainder of the discussion.  
Based on our Nash equilibrium price-setting game previously discussed, the median 
quarterly variable profit for an airline in a directional origin-destination market is estimated to be 
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$31,492.71.  Estimates from Table 1.8 show that the average estimated entry cost is 
approximately $30,574, which is approximately 97 percent of variable profit.  The decision of 
market entry is forward-looking, and our estimates suggest that it will take an airline slightly less 
than one quarter of variable profit to recoup the one-time sunk entry cost investment.  Of course, 
an airline typically needs to use a portion of its variable profit to pay for recurrent fixed expenses 
that, in part, may be related to its airport operations – e.g. labor cost of ground crew at airport.  
Therefore, it is likely to take more than one quarter of variable profits to recoup the one-time 
sunk entry cost investment.   
However, it is notable from the estimates that mean entry cost differs by the carrier 
categories considered.  Southwest has the highest mean market entry cost followed by legacy 
carriers and other low-cost-carriers, $33,498, $30,755 and $27,468 respectively.  Furthermore, 
the pairwise difference between any two of these three mean market entry costs is statistically 
significant at conventional levels of statistical significance.  Even though Southwest has the 
highest mean market entry cost, estimates from our short-run supply model reveal that it also has 
a relatively high median quarterly market-level variable profit of $61,490.78.  So based on 
Southwest’s relatively high variable profit, it will only take Southwest a minimum of 0.54 of a 
quarter (approximately 49 days) of variable profit to recoup it’s one-time sunk entry cost 
investment.  In contrast, other low-cost-carriers have the lowest mean market entry cost, but they 
also have relatively low variable profit, a median $35,976.57.  So on average it takes other low-
cost-carriers 0.76 of a quarter (approximately 69 days), which is longer than what it takes 
Southwest, of variable profits to recoup their one-time sunk entry cost investment. 
“Size of Presence at market endpoints” in the entry cost function is variable         in 
equation (14).  The estimated entry cost coefficient on “Size of Presence at market endpoints” is 
negative and statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance, suggesting 
that an airline’s market entry cost decreases with the size of the airline’s presence at the endpoint 
cities of the market.  In other words, larger endpoint city presence makes it easier for the airline 
to actually start servicing the route.  This result is consistent with how the literature believes 















Fixed cost (quarterly): 
      Mean fixed cost 1.9067E-09 0.0058 
    Size of Presence at market endpoints -4.5820E-14 0.0001 
   Entry costs: 
     Mean entry cost for Legacy carriers 3.0755*** 0.0277 
   Mean entry cost for Southwest 3.3498*** 0.0815 
   Mean entry cost for Other LCCs 2.7468*** 0.0649 
   Size of Presence at market endpoints -0.0072*** 0.0004 
   Traditional Codesharing  -0.0197*** 0.0024 
   Virtual Codesharing  -0.0042** 0.0019 
   Traditional Codesharing × Southwest 0.0295*** 0.0099 
   Virtual Codesharing × Southwest 0.0069 0.0065 
   Traditional Codesharing × Other LCCs 0.0090 0.0073 
   Virtual Codesharing × Other LCCs -0.0058 0.0051 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
**   indicates statistical significance at 5% 
 
The coefficient estimates on traditional and virtual codesharing variables are negative and 
statistically significant.  Based on our previous discussion of the interpretation of parameters in 
the entry cost function (equation (14)), the coefficients on these two codeshare variables 
essentially capture the influence of codesharing on the market entry cost of potential entrants that 
are legacy carriers.  Therefore, these coefficient estimates suggest that an increase in the extent 
of codesharing by incumbent carriers in a market reduces the market entry cost of potential 
entrants that are legacy carriers.  
Recall that our descriptive statistics in Table 1.3 show that: (1) the vast majority of 
codeshare products are provided by legacy carriers; and (2) almost all of each legacy carrier’s 
codeshare products are codeshared with other legacy carriers.  Therefore, the econometric 
evidence in Table 1.8 suggesting that more codesharing in a market makes it less costly for 
potential entrant legacy carriers to enter the market may in part be driven by the Chen and Ross 
(2000) argument, which is that incumbents may offer to share their facility (in our context, 
predominantly airplane seats owned by legacy carriers) with some potential entrants (apparently 
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other legacy carriers) in order to discourage the potential entrant from entering on a larger, and 
more competitive, scale by exclusively using its own plane on the full route.  In other words, 
entry may be encouraged, as reflected by the lower entry cost, in a way that limits the scale of 
entry.         
A key result is that the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable between traditional 
codesharing and Southwest is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient estimate 
on the interaction variable between virtual codesharing and Southwest is not statistically 
significant.  These coefficient estimates suggest that traditional codesharing between incumbent 
carriers raises Southwest’s entry cost to the relevant market, relative to the fall in entry cost of 
potential entrant legacy carriers, but virtual codesharing does not differentially affect Southwest’ 
market entry cost relative to potential entrant legacy carriers.  In other words, more traditional 
codesharing between incumbent carriers in a market puts Southwest at a relative disadvantage to 
enter the market compared to potential entrant legacy carriers. 
The coefficient estimates on the interactions between Other low-cost-carriers and 
codeshare variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  In other words, in terms of dollar amount changes, neither type of codesharing 
differentially affect Other low-cost-carriers market entry cost, relative to the fall in entry cost of 
potential entrant legacy carriers.  We argue above that a possible reason why potential entrant 
legacy carriers find it less costly to enter markets with more codesharing is due to the fact that 
the incumbents that codeshare are typically legacy carriers, and legacy carriers typically 
codeshare with other legacy carriers.  So what is the rationale for the econometric result that 
potential entrants that are other low-cost carriers do not find it any more difficult than potential 
entrant legacy carriers to enter a market with higher levels of codesharing?  Perhaps a reason for 
this result is that a large set of consumers served by other low-cost carriers does not have 
significant overlap with the set of consumers served by legacy carriers, and therefore the two 
carrier types only weakly compete with each other.  Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) provide 
evidence that supports this argument.  Specifically, they find that incumbent legacy carriers do 
not cut fares in response to potential competition from other low-cost carriers, but cut fares by 8% 
in response to potential competition from Southwest. 
A useful feature of the structural econometric model is that the model allows us to 
monetize the extent to which codesharing by market incumbent carriers influences market entry 
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barriers faced by potential entrants.  Parameter estimates in the entry cost function suggest that 
each percentage point increase in traditional codeshare products offered by incumbents in a 
market raises market entry cost for Southwest by 0.3% ( 
         
       
    ).  In contrast, each 
percentage point increase in traditional codeshare products offered by incumbents in a market 
reduces market entry cost by 0.6% ( 
    
       
    ) for potential entrant legacy carriers, and by 
0.7% ( 
    
       
    ) for potential entrants that are “other” low-cost carriers. 
 Summary of key findings and discussion 
In summary, based on coefficient estimates in the entry cost function, we can conclude 
that more traditional codesharing between incumbent carriers in a market puts Southwest at a 
relative disadvantage to enter the market compared to all other potential entrants (legacy carriers 
and other low-cost carriers).  We interpret this result as suggesting that traditional codesharing 
has a relative market entry deterrent effect on Southwest.  Furthermore, the results suggest that 
virtual codesharing does not have a market entry deterrent effect. 
Codeshare partner carriers typically make their frequent-flyer programs reciprocal.  In 
situations where partner carriers’ route networks are complementary, and therefore require 
passengers to fly on separate partner carriers’ planes to complete a trip, there are greater 
opportunities for passengers to accumulate frequent-flyer miles from the partner's reciprocal 
frequent-flyer programs.  In other words, frequent-flyer membership with a partner carrier is 
likely more valuable to customers when partner carriers’ networks are complementary.  This 
suggests that market incumbents can more effectively increase their loyal customer base with 
traditional codesharing than they can via virtual codesharing, since traditional codesharing 
requires travel across complementary partner carriers’ networks, while virtual codesharing 
requires air travel on a single carriers’ network.  The previously discussed demand results 
support this argument, since relevant demand coefficient estimates suggest that traditional 
codesharing is likely more demand-increasing for an airline relative to virtual codesharing.  
An increase in incumbents’ loyal customer base makes it more difficult for a new entrant 
to amass a sufficiently large customer base to make entry profitable.  Therefore, the empirical 
result from our entry cost estimates suggesting that traditional codesharing between incumbents 
is entry deterring, but virtual codesharing is not, is quite reasonable and consistent with the 
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arguments above and supported by our demand-side results on codesharing.  Note also that 
Southwest’s relatively higher market entry cost may simply be reflecting the increased difficulty 
it will face to amass a sufficiently larger customer base in these codeshare markets. 
 5. Concluding Remarks 
The main objective of our paper is to use a structural econometric model to investigate: 
(1) whether codesharing between airlines in domestic air travel markets, a form of strategic 
alliance, has a deterrent effect on the entry of potential competitors; (2) whether there is a 
particular type of codesharing among alliance partners that is most effective at deterring entry; 
and (3) whether there is a particular type of airline that seems to be more deterred via such type 
of codesharing between alliance partners.  One advantage of using a structural econometric 
model is that we are able to quantify, in monetary terms, possible market entry barriers 
associated with codesharing. 
We find that more traditional codesharing between incumbent carriers in a market puts 
Southwest at a relative disadvantage to enter the market compared to all other potential entrants 
(legacy carriers and other low-cost carriers).  Specifically, each percentage point increase in 
traditional codeshare products offered by incumbents in a market raises market entry cost for 
Southwest by 0.3%, but reduces market entry cost by 0.6% and 0.7% for legacy and “other” low-
cost carriers respectively.  Therefore, traditional codesharing by market incumbent carriers has a 
relative market entry deterrent effect on Southwest.  Furthermore, we do not find any evidence 
that virtual codesharing has a market entry deterrent effect. 
We link the market entry deterrent effects inferred from our entry cost estimates to 
findings from our demand estimates.  Estimates from our demand model suggest that 
incumbents’ traditional codesharing has a larger demand-increasing effect for their products 
compared to virtual codesharing.  Since the demand-side evidence is consistent with the 
argument that traditional codesharing better serves to expand the loyal customer base of market 
incumbents, then with more traditional codesharing by incumbents, a potential entrant will find it 
more costly (higher market entry cost) to build its own customer base upon entry, making entry 
less profitable in these high traditional codeshare markets.  We argue that this entry deterrent 
effect is binding for Southwest but not for others due to evidence that the vast majority of 
codesharing is done between legacy carriers, and competition between Southwest and legacy 
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carriers is stronger than competition between other low-cost carriers and legacy carriers.  For 
example, Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) provide evidence that incumbent legacy carriers do 
not cut fares in response to potential competition from other low-cost carriers, but cut fares by 
8% in response to potential competition from Southwest. 
We also find that an airline’s market entry cost decreases with the size of the airline’s 
presence at the endpoint cities of the market.  This finding is consistent with findings in 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), and may be due to economies of scale and scope by concentrating 
most operations in a hub airport. 
The focus of our study is on U.S. domestic air travel markets, however future work may 
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Appendix A - Transition Rules for State Variables 
 
The state variables we observe are: 
          
                                           .  Transition rules for state variables 
are as follows: 
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The joint transition probabilities of the state variables are determined by: 
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Appendix B - Representation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
using Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs) 
 
Recall that expected one-period profit function,     (      ), is specified as: 
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where parametric specifications for     and     were previously given in equations (13) and 
(14).  Based on equation (B1): 
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Therefore, we can re-write: 
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As discussed in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), the MPE can be represented as a vector of 
conditional choice probabilities (CCPs), P.  P = {Pi(y): for every firm and state (i, y)} that solves 
fixed point problem    (   ) is a vector of best response mapping: 
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where in our study  ( ) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
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where F 𝑦
P ( )  and F 𝑦
P ( )  are state transition probability matrices for       and       
respectively;  𝑧  
  and     
  are vectors of valuations that depend on CCPs and transition 
probabilities, but not on the dynamic parameters being estimated. Since      is assumed type 1 
extreme value distributed,   
  is a function vector equal to   
      (  ( )) where γ = 0.5772 





















Appendix C - Implementing the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) 
Estimator 
 Given the PML estimator,  ̂   , and the initial nonparametric estimate of CCPs,   ̂, we 
construct a new estimator of CCPs,   ̂ ,using the best response CCPs equation   ̂  
 (    ̂  ̂   ).  Then we redo the maximization of the pseudo likelihood function to obtain a 
new estimate of   using   ̂, instead of    ̂, in the pseudo log likelihood function, that is, we solve 
 ̂        
 
 (    ̂).  The process is repeated K times, and the K
th
 estimates of   and P are 
obtained by  ̂        
 
 (      ̂) and   ̂   (      ̂  ̂ ) respectively.  The algorithm is 
terminated on the K
th
 iteration only if the CCP vector   ̂ is “close” to     ̂ based on a stipulated 
tolerance level.  Based on this algorithm, an NPL fixed point is defined as a pair ( ̂      ̂).  
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) argue that this NPL estimation algorithm can reduce 























Chapter 2 - Firms’ Markup, Cost, and Price Changes when 
Policymakers Permit Collusion: Does Anti-trust Immunity Matter? 
 1. Introduction 
The expansion of international airline alliances since the 1990s has drawn considerable 
attention of researchers and policymakers.  The three major global airline alliances are: Star, 
SkyTeam, and oneworld.  By joining a global alliance, an airline can leverage its partner carriers’ 
route networks to extend its service to destinations in foreign countries that the airline could not 
otherwise serve using its own planes.  Even though such interline service may be available to 
passengers without an alliance between the carriers, partner carriers in an alliance typically 
coordinate to make interline transfers seamless for passengers.  In addition, partner carriers 
typically make their frequent-flyer programs reciprocal, thus allowing passengers with 
membership in any partner carrier’s frequent-flyer program to accumulate and redeem frequent-
flyer points across any carrier of the alliance.  
Alliance partners often want to extend cooperation to revenue sharing, which effectively 
implies joint pricing of products.  This type of cooperation in markets where the partners each 
offer substitute service is believed to harm competition and therefore violates antitrust laws.  As 
such, alliance partners can only explicitly collude on price if the relevant authorities in each 
country exempt the partner carriers from prosecution under the country’s antitrust laws – a grant 
of antitrust immunity.   
To explicitly collude on price, airlines must first formally apply to the relevant authorities 
for antitrust immunity.  The application process provides carriers with the opportunity to make 
their case to the relevant authorities that the level of cooperation that antitrust immunity would 
allow will yield net benefits to consumers.  A grant of antitrust immunity is usually justified on 
grounds that the cooperative actions of partner carriers that are in violation of antitrust laws 
produce benefits to consumers that are sufficient to outweigh the cost of reduced competition.  
There are numerous instances since the 1990,s in which airlines have been successful in 
convincing the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
that granting them antitrust immunity is, on net, beneficial for consumers.  However, in recent 
time the DOJ has argued that antitrust immunity is not necessary for the alliance to yield net 
benefits for consumers and alliance carriers.  In 2009 DOJ expressed this view in commenting on 
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the joint application for antitrust immunity from five members of the oneworld alliance.
15
  
Furthermore, DOJ points out that granting these airlines antitrust immunity will reduce 
competition in origin-destination markets between the U.S. and Europe where these carriers 
compete using nonstop flights. 
Despite DOJ’s concerns regarding granting antitrust immunity to these airlines, the DOT 
was convinced that there are sufficient efficiency gains associated with granting the carriers 
antitrust immunity, such that on net consumers would ultimately benefit.  Since it is the DOT 
that has the statutory authority to approve and immunize from the U.S. antitrust laws agreements 
relating to international air transportation, DOT granted the carriers antitrust immunity in 2010.  
Given the opposing positions that these two key government authorities took in this case, it is 
necessary to carefully study these issues to facilitate future policymaking decisions of this nature.  
As such, this paper has two main objectives: (1) investigate the effects of granting antitrust 
immunity on price, markup, and various categories of partner carriers' costs; and (2) investigate 
the relative effects of implementing an alliance without antitrust immunity versus an alliance 
with antitrust immunity.      
There has been extensive work examining the airfare effect of alliances.  Many studies 
find that airline cooperation due to an alliance puts downward pressure on fares in interline 
markets due to product complementarity and the mitigation of double marginalization.
16
 
However, as previously suggested, an alliance can also reduce competition in markets where the 
partners’ route networks overlap (typically their interhub markets), which would put pressure on 
fares to rise in these markets.  Zou, Oum and Yu (2011) argue that it is possible that an alliance 
causes fares to increase even in markets where the partners’ route segments are complementary 
rather than overlapping, since the quality of interline connections improves with an alliance and 
consequently demand may increase.  
The arguments above describe situations in which an alliance may affect price via 
influencing the carriers’ optimal choice of product markup over marginal cost.  So the predicted 
                                                 
15
 See: OST-2008-0252 – Public Version Comments of the Department of Justice.  Document can be downloaded at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/253575.htm. 
16
 See Brueckner and Whalen (2000); Brueckner (2001 and 2003); Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004); Ito 




price effects based on the previously discussed arguments assume that marginal cost is 
unchanged.  However, an alliance may influence partner carriers’ marginal cost of transporting 
passengers.  Specifically, by appropriately integrating their route networks, partner carriers can 
better fill their planes on a segment of an interline trip by channeling passengers from different 
origins through a common trip segment.  Such cooperation enables carriers to exploit economies 
of passenger-traffic density, i.e., the marginal cost of transporting a passenger on a route is lower 
the more passengers that the airline transports on segments of the route [Brueckner and Spiller 
(1994); Brueckner (2001 and 2003); and Keeler and Formby (1994)]. 
Gayle and Le (2013) argue that an alliance may not only influence partner carriers’ 
marginal cost, but also their recurrent fixed and sunk market entry costs.  A carrier’s market 
entry cost may fall because the alliance effectively allows the carrier to enter several new origin-
destination markets more cheaply by leveraging its partners’ network rather than having to 
exclusively use its own planes to enter these markets.  They point out that a carriers’ recurrent 
fixed cost may either rise or fall due to the alliance.  For example, accommodating a higher 
volume of passengers may require partner carriers to acquire more airport gates and a larger 
airport staff to handle more intensive airport operations, which would increase partners’ 
recurrent fixed cost.  On the other hand, alliance partners often share their airport facilities 
(lounges, gates, check-in counters etc.), and ground and flight personnel, which may result in 
more efficient use of airport facilities and staff, and therefore effectively yield recurrent fixed 
cost savings [Park (1997)].  In their empirical investigation of the cost effects of the domestic 
alliance between Delta, Continental and Northwest airlines, Gayle and Le (2013) find evidence 
that this alliance influenced the partner carriers’ marginal, recurrent fixed, and sunk market entry 
costs. 
Based on the preceding discussions, the effect of alliances on fares may depend on the 
relative magnitudes of cost-savings and optimal markup changes.  A retrospective assessment of 
cost changes separate from markup changes associated with an alliance before and after antitrust 
immunity is granted may provide policymakers with some perspective on the efficacy of 
granting antitrust immunity.  Our study focuses on identifying these effects in case of the 
oneworld alliance. 
Researchers have investigated the relative effects of a codeshare alliance with and 
without antitrust immunity (ATI).  For example, Bruckner (2003) finds that the effect of 
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codesharing on fares is smaller than the effect of ATI, while Whalen (2007) finds a similar result 
and additionally finds that prices for immunized alliance service are equal to online service.  
Bruckner, Lee and Singer (2011) show that codesharing, alliance service, and antitrust immunity 
each separately reduces fares below the traditional interline level, while Bilotkach (2005) shows 
that granting ATI pushes up fares for non-stop trips between hub airports and does not generate 
any additional benefits to interline passengers, as compared with alliances without immunity.  
None of the studies separately identify the effects of an alliance and ATI on markup 
versus cost, which is essential to better understand the efficacy of granting ATI.  Therefore, a 
key distinguishing feature of our study from others in the literature is that we use a structural 
model to disentangle markup changes from cost changes associated with an alliance and ATI. 
We first specify and estimate air travel demand using a discrete choice model.  Then, for 
the short-run supply-side, we assume that multiproduct airlines set prices for their differentiated 
products according to a Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  The Nash equilibrium price-
setting assumption allows us to derive product-specific markups and recover product-level 
marginal costs.  With the estimated marginal costs in hand, we are able to specify and estimate a 
marginal cost function.  The marginal cost specification allows us to estimate marginal cost 
changes for the alliance members across pre-post periods of implementation of the alliance 
without ATI.  Similarly, we are able to estimate marginal cost changes for the alliance members 
across pre-post periods of obtaining ATI.  With product-level markup estimates in hand, we then 
separately specify and estimate markup equations that identify changes in the alliance members’ 
markup across pre-post periods of alliance implementation and pre-post periods of obtaining 
ATI, respectively.  
Next, we compute firm-level variable profits using the derived markups and quantity 
sold.  With data on which markets each firm is active in or not during specific time periods, as 
well as our estimates of their variable profits when they are active in markets, we are able to 
estimate a dynamic entry/exit game.  The dynamic entry/exit game allows us to estimate 
recurrent fixed cost and market entry cost functions.  These functions are specified to identify 
changes in alliance partners’ recurrent fixed and market entry costs across pre-post periods of 
alliance implementation and pre-post periods of obtaining ATI respectively. 
Our econometric estimates suggest the following.  First, implementation of the oneworld 
alliance did not have an impact on the markup of products offered by the members.  For the 
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subsequent grant of ATI to various members, even though we find evidence of increased markup 
on their products in markets where ATI carrier members each provide substitute products (their 
overlapping markets), the members’ markup in other markets decreased. 
Second, implementation of the oneworld alliance appears to increase rather than reduce 
marginal cost for the members, but the subsequent grant of ATI to various members is associated 
with reductions in their marginal costs.  So the evidence does support the argument that granting 
of ATI better enables members to achieve cost efficiency gains, perhaps due to more effective 
cooperation between these members.  Third, both implementation of the oneworld alliance and 
subsequent grant of ATI to various members do not appear to have an impact on partners’ sunk 
market entry cost, but the grant of ATI weakly reduced their recurrent fixed cost. 
Last, results from a reduced-form price regression suggest that implementation of the 
oneworld alliance increased rather than reduced the prices of products offered by the members.  
More importantly, the subsequent grant of ATI to various members had no effect on price of 
products offered by ATI carrier members in their overlapping markets, and it led to reductions in 
their product price in all other markets.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides relevant 
background information on the oneworld alliance and subsequent grant of ATI to various 
members of the alliance.  We define some relevant concepts and discuss the data in section 3.  In 
section 4 we present our econometric model.  In section 5 we discuss estimation procedures.  
Estimation results are presented and discussed in section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
 2. Background Information on oneworld Alliance and Antitrust Immunity 
On September 21, 1998, American Airlines, British Airways, Canadian Airlines
17
, 
Cathay Pacific, and Qantas unveiled the formation of oneworld, one of the world’s three largest 
global airline alliances.  The other two major global alliances are Star Alliance and SkyTeam.  
The oneworld alliance was officially launched and started its operation on February 1, 1999.  
Since its inception, several airlines have joined the alliance.  Table D1 in Appendix D lists 
members of the alliance at the beginning of 2013.  A few more airlines are expected to enter the 
alliance in 2013-2014.  The central office for the alliance is based in New York City, New York, 
in the U.S.  
                                                 
17
 Canadian Airlines was acquired by Air Canada in 2000 and then exited oneworld alliance. 
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The oneworld alliance global airline network provides services to more than 800 
destinations in over 150 countries.
18
  It is argued that flying with oneworld allows passengers to 
enjoy multiple privileges.  For example, a passenger who is a member of the frequent-flyer 
program (FFP) offered by a oneworld carrier is able to earn and redeem frequent-flyer points 
across other oneworld partner carriers.  Second, smooth transfer between partner airlines brings 
more convenience and reduces layover time for passengers.
19
 
Foreign and major U.S. airlines may request a grant of immunity from the U.S. antitrust 
laws to operate certain commercial alliances.  Airlines with immunity can coordinate their fares, 
services, and capacity as if they were a single carrier in origin-destination markets. Table D2 in 
Appendix D lists airline alliances operating with antitrust immunity.  On August 14, 2008, five 
members of the oneworld alliance, American Airlines; British Airways; Finnair; Iberia; and 
Royal Jordanian Airlines, jointly applied for antitrust immunity for a set of bilateral and 
multilateral alliance agreements.  The DOT tentatively approved and granted antitrust immunity 
to alliance agreements between and among the five airlines on February 13, 2010,
20
 and issued a 
final order of approval on July 20, 2010. 
As part of the approval, American, British Airways and Iberia can implement a joint 
business venture (JBA) to connect their transatlantic flight services more closely.  However, the 
grant of immunity is subject to a slot remedy.  A “slot” is the name given to an airline’s right to 
land and takeoff at a given airport.  The slot remedy requires the airlines to transfer four slot 
pairs at London Heathrow to competitors for a period of at least 10 years.
21
  The rationale put 
forth by the DOT is that this slot remedy will sufficiently lower market entry barriers for 
potential competitors, and therefore effectively constrain anticompetitive behavior of the 
antitrust immune carriers. 
22
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 Oneworld at a glance http://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance 
19
 This information is attained from http://www.oneworld.com/ffp/. 
20
 Order 2010-2-13 found at http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostdocket2010/order20100208.html 
21
 Order 2010-7-8 - American, British Airways, Finnair, Iberia and Royal Jordanian - Final Order - Antitrust 
Immunity.  Issued by United States Department of Transportation.  Document can be downloaded at: 
http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostdocket2010/order20100708.html 
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American Airlines, which serves 273 cities in 51 countries, is one of the largest carriers 
in the world with total revenues of about $25 billion in 2013.
23
 American’s primary hubs are 
based in Dallas, Chicago, and Miami.  British Airways, which is also among the world’s largest 
international airlines, is the flag carrier airline of the United Kingdom and has its main hub at 
London Heathrow Airport.  In addition, British Airways serves 190 cities in 89 countries.  Iberia, 
the largest airline of Spain, merged with British Airways on November 29, 2010.  These three 
airlines provide the vast majority of oneworld service between the U.S. and Europe and they 
codeshare
24
 among each other.  Finnair and Royal Jordanian provide a very limited amount of 
transatlantic service. 
The application for ATI by oneworld members in 2008, which was eventually granted in 
2010, was actually the third attempt by oneworld members to seek ATI.  The previous two 
attempts were unsuccessful.  The first of the previous two attempts came in 1997 when American 
and British Airways applied for ATI, but the DOT dismissed the application due to failure of the 
liberalization of the Bermuda II Treaty.
25
  In 2001, the carriers again requested antitrust 
immunity and DOT issued a show cause order to grant immunity conditionally.  However, 
American and British Airways withdrew their application. 
In their application of 2008, the five oneworld alliance applicants claim that they seek 
antitrust immunity in order to better compete with SkyTeam and Star alliances, which both had 
received immunity.  The oneworld alliance applicants stated that: “The recent expansion of Star 
and SkyTeam makes the proposed alliance necessary to maintain inter-alliance competition and 
to achieve the full benefits of U.S. – EU Open Skies.”
26,27
  They believe that the transatlantic 
network integration from antitrust immunity and JBA could allow the applicants to provide 
services to more markets between oneworld hubs, Star and SkyTeam hubs, and spoke cities in 
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 Oneworld at a glance at http://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance 
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 Codeshare is the name given to agreements between partner carriers that allow a carrier to market and sell tickets 
to consumers for seats on its partners’ plane.   
25
 Bernuda II treaty was a bilateral air transport agreement between the governments of the United States and the 
United Kingdom signed on 23 July 1977.  
26
 In 2007, the United States and the European Union signed a new “open skies” to replace Bermuda II. 
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 For summary of arguments that applicants made in their joint application see: OST-2008-0252 – Public Version 




Europe, thus facilitating the inter-alliance competition.  In addition, the applicants assert that 
approval of the antitrust immunity and JBA will bring a number of benefits to both consumers 
and the applicants’ employees and shareholders.  
In response to the application, DOJ issued a recommendation report on the possible 
market effects of granting antitrust immunity.
28
  DOJ strongly believes that granting antitrust 
immunity would harm competition in transatlantic markets.  Specifically, DOJ argues that the 
reduction in number of nonstop competitors caused by granting immunity would likely result in 
significant fare increases.  In addition, DOJ believes that entry is difficult in hub-to-hub routes 
and thus is unlikely to inhibit price increases.  Moreover, DOJ suggests that immunity is not 
required to achieve the benefits claimed in the application. 
 3. Definitions and Data 
 3.1 Definitions 
We now define some important concepts that are used throughout this paper.  A market is 
defined as directional pair of origin and destination airports during a particular time period.  For 
example, irrespective of intermediate stop(s), one market constitutes air travel from Los Angeles 
International airport to London Heathrow airport during the first quarter of 1998.  A flight 
itinerary is a detailed plan for roundtrip air travel that includes all airport stops from origin to 
destination and back to origin. 
Each segment of a trip (air travel between two airports) has a ticket coupon. For each 
coupon there is an operating carrier and a ticketing carrier.  The operating carrier is the airline 
that actually uses its own plane to transport passengers, while the ticketing carrier, also referred 
to as marketing carrier, is the airline that sells tickets for seats on the operating carrier’s plane.  A 
product is defined as a combination of itinerary, ticketing carrier, and operating carrier(s) for all 
segments of the trip. We only focus on products with the same ticketing carrier for all trip 
segments, but operating carriers may differ across trip segments. 
We classify characteristics of a travel itinerary for each direction of air travel on the 
itinerary into the following categories: (1) Pure Online; (2) Traditional Codeshare Type I; (3) 
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Traditional Codeshare Type II; and (4) Virtual Codeshare.  Table 2.1 provides examples of these 
categories for an itinerary that uses two segments (i.e. requires one intermediate stop) for the 
given direction
29
 of air travel being classified.  We independently classify each direction of air 
travel on a given itinerary, and therefore the classification category for the going segment(s) of 
the trip may be different from the classification category on the coming back segment(s) of the 
trip. 
The segment(s) of an itinerary that the passenger uses for travel in a given direction is 
defined as pure online if the same carrier serves as both the operating and ticketing carrier for all 
segments of the itinerary.  For the example in the table, Delta Airlines (DL) is the ticking carrier 
for the first and second segments of the trip, denoted by DL: DL.  Moreover, Delta is also the 
operating carrier for these two segments. 
 
Table 2.1 Examples of Itinerary Categories 
 for a given Direction of Air Travel  
Itinerary Category  Ticking Carrier Operating Carriers 
Pure Online DL:DL DL:DL 
Traditional Type I SN:SN SN:OS 
Traditional Type II DL:DL SN:OS 
Virtual  DL:DL SN:SN 
 
The segment(s) of an itinerary that the passenger uses for travel in a given direction is 
defined as codeshare when operating carrier(s) differ from ticketing carrier.  Codeshare 
itineraries may either be Traditional Type I; Traditional Type II; or Virtual.  The segments of air 
travel in a given direction on an itinerary are classified as Traditional Type I if operating carriers 
across the segments differ, and the ticketing carrier is one of the distinct operating carriers, but 
Traditional Type II if the ticketing carrier is not one of the distinct operating carriers.  Table 2.1 
shows carrier information for a given direction of air travel on an itinerary that is Traditional 
Type I since the operating carriers are Sabena Belgian World Airlines (SN) and Austrian Airlines 
(OS), and the ticketing carrier is Sabena Belgian World Airlines.  The table also shows that the 
classification would instead be Traditional Type II if the ticketing carrier is Delta Airlines (DL) 
rather than Sabena Belgian World Airlines.  
                                                 
29
 Direction of air travel here means either going to the destination or coming back from the destination. 
56 
 
Last, the segment(s) of an itinerary for a given direction of air travel is (are) classified as 
virtual codeshare if the segment(s) use(s) the same operating carrier, but the ticketing carrier is 
different.  The virtual codeshare example in the table indicates that Delta is the ticking carrier, 
but Sabena Belgian World Airlines operates on all segments of the trip. 
 3.2 Data 
The source of data used in our study is the International Passenger Airline Origin and 
Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics.  The database comes from a quarterly survey of ten percent of the 
passengers traveling through at least one route segment that is flown by a U.S. carrier.  Each 
observation represents an itinerary that was purchased at a specific price by a given number of 
passengers during a quarter.  Information provided by each observation includes: (1) the number 
of passengers paying the given fare during the quarter; (2) mileage for each itinerary segment; 
(3) numeric codes identifying each airport, city, and country on the itinerary; and (4) identity of 
operating and ticketing carriers on the itinerary.  In addition, turnaround points in the itinerary 
can be identified by the trip break code.  The trip break code is useful for identifying the origin 
and destination. 
We compiled two separate data samples from the database.  One sample, which we refer 
to as the “oneworld Event Sample”, is compiled specifically for studying market effects 
associated with implementation of the oneworld alliance.  The “oneworld Event Sample” covers 
periods before and after implementation of the oneworld alliance.  As we previously stated, the 
oneworld alliance was officially launched and started its operation on February 1, 1999.  The 
pre-alliance periods in the “oneworld Event Sample” are quarters 1 and 2 of 1998, while the 
post-alliance periods are quarters 1 and 2 of 2001.  The reason we use quarters 1 and 2 of 2001 
as the post-alliance periods is to avoid capturing the impacts that the terrorist attack of 9-11 had 
on air travel, which would confound identifying the pure effects of implementing the oneworld 
alliance. 
The other data sample, which we refer to as the “ATI Event Sample”, is compiled 
specifically for studying market effects associated with the granting of ATI to various members 
of the oneworld alliance.  The “ATI Event Sample” covers periods before and after ATI was 
granted.  As we previously stated, on August 14, 2008, five members of the oneworld alliance 
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jointly applied for ATI, but it was not until July 20, 2010 that the DOT issued a final order of 
approval for ATI.  The pre-ATI periods in the “ATI Event Sample” are quarters 2 and 3 of 2008, 
while the post-ATI periods are quarters 2 and 3 of 2011. 
Note that American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, and Qantas are founders of 
oneworld alliance, but Iberia and Finnair entered the alliance in the same year of alliance 
formation, and LAN joined the alliance in year 2000.  Therefore, we only consider these seven 
airlines as oneworld alliance members in the “oneworld Event Sample”.  In the “ATI Event 
Sample”, American Airlines, British Airways, Iberia, Finnair, and Royal Jordanian are the 
oneworld members that were granted ATI.   
It is important to note that the names we use to label these data samples do not imply that 
the only airlines in each sample are members of the oneworld alliance.  The name given to a data 
sample purely relates to the event that the data sample is used to study.  Therefore, each sample 
comprises a wide array of airlines.  There are 65 ticketing carriers in the “oneworld Event 
Sample”, while the “ATI Event Sample” contains 72 ticketing carriers.  Table D3 and Table AD 
in Appendix D list all the ticketing carriers in each data sample respectively. 
We apply several restrictions to “clean” the raw data.  First, observations in which 
itineraries have more than 8 coupons are eliminated.  Second, we only keep observations with 
roundtrip itineraries, so the starting and ending airports are the same.  Third, itineraries that are 
cheaper than $100 or more expensive than $10,000 are deleted.  Fourth, origin airports must be 
located in the 48 main land states of the U.S., while destination airports are located in other 
countries.  However, itineraries with origin airport outside the U.S. and destination airport within 
the U.S. are not included because it is difficult to collect demographic data (e.g. population size) 
for cities of origin airports located outside the United States.  We need data on population size in 
origin cities in order to measure potential market size and to compute observed product shares in 
our study.  
The data that remain after applying the restrictions above do have repeated observations 
of products that have different prices and numbers of passengers within each quarter.  During 
each quarter we compute the average price and aggregate the number of passengers associated 
with unique products (itinerary-airline(s) combination), then collapse the data in each quarter by 
only keeping unique products. In the end, we have 164,908 products (observations) across 
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55,641 markets in the collapsed “oneworld Event Sample”, and 333,450 products across 84,740 
markets in the collapsed “ATI Event Sample”.  
In the “oneworld Event Sample” and the “ATI Event Sample”, there are respectively 142 
and 181 destination countries across six world continents.  Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 respectively 
list destination countries in each dataset for which the percent of products that have the country 
as a destination is at least 1 percent.  In the “oneworld Event Sample”, among 142 destination 
countries, only 26 of them are destinations for a sufficiently large number of itineraries that 
satisfy the “at least 1 percent of products” threshold.  However, the percent of products in the 
“oneworld Event Sample” with air travel to these 26 countries is almost 80 percent.  In the “ATI 
Event Sample” there are only 21 destination countries out of 181 that satisfy the “at least 1 
percent of products” threshold, but the percent of products in this sample with air travel to these 
21 countries is around 72 percent. 
Based on the collapsed datasets, we create additional variables needed in our study.  
These variables are constructed to capture various non-price characteristics of air travel products.  
The reader will observe in subsequent sections of the paper that our model of demand and short-
run supply requires data on product characteristics for econometric estimation. 
 






 countries  
Percent of 
products offered 
Canada 15.34 Hong Kong 1.41 
Mexico 13.18 Philippines 1.38 
United Kingdom 6.40 Switzerland 1.38 
Germany 6.12 Dominican Republic 1.24 
France 5.01 Netherlands Antilles 1.21 
Bahamas 3.27 Australia 1.18 
Japan 3.17 Cayman Islands 1.15 
Italy 2.54 South Korea 1.07 
Netherlands 2.01 Aruba 1.03 
Brazil 1.86 Belgium 1.03 
Jamaica 1.84 India 1.03 
Spain 1.72 Thailand 1 
Costa Rica 1.48 Others 20.50 














Mexico 13.16 Costa Rica 1.62 
Canada 12.53 Brazil 1.62 
United Kingdom 6.52 Netherlands 1.55 
Germany 5.47 Ireland 1.49 
Italy 4.22 India 1.30 
France 3.65 Switzerland 1.19 
Bahamas 2.89 Aruba 1.15 
Spain 2.88 South Korea 1.07 
China 2.52 Australia 1.04 
Dominican Republic 2.13 Other countries 27.96 
Japan 2.06 Total 100 
Jamaica 1.98   
  
We define origin presence variables from two different perspectives. The variable 
Opres_demand is a count of the number of different airports that the airline has nonstop flights to, 
leaving from the origin airport.  On the other hand, Opres_cost counts the number of airports 
within the United States that the airline provides nonstop flights from, going to the origin airport.  
Opres_demand is constructed to help explain variations in demand across carriers for the 
products offered to consumers at the consumers’ origin airport, i.e., this variable helps explain 
consumers' choice between airlines at the consumer's origin airport.  The presumption here is that 
a consumer is more likely to choose the airline that offers nonstop service to more cities from the 
consumer's origin airport.  On the other hand, Opres_cost is intended to help capture airlines’ 
cost effects.  The idea is that the larger is an airline’s Opres_cost measure at the origin of a 
market, the larger the volume of passengers the airline is likely to channel through the market 
and therefore the airline is expected to have lower marginal cost of transporting a passenger in 
this market due to economies of passenger-traffic density. 
Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming are dummy variables we construct to equal to 1 if 
the product uses nonstop itinerary for departing and returning legs of the trip, respectively.  The 
variables Distance_going and Distance_coming respectively measure the market miles flown 
between origin and destination for departing and returning trips.  
The variables Inconvenience_going and Inconvenience_coming are respectively defined 
as ratios of the miles actually flown on the itinerary to the minimum miles flown in that market 
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for departing and returning trips.  As such, the minimum value Inconvenience_going or 
Inconvenience_coming can take is 1.  Furthermore, an itinerary is less convenient as 
Inconvenience_going or Inconvenience_coming increases in value above 1.  
Observed product share, Sj, is computed by dividing quantity of product   sold by origin 
city population, i.e.    
  
   ⁄ .
30
  The population data are obtained from the population 
estimates of United States Census Bureau. 
To properly identify codeshare products, we appropriately recode the feeder/regional 
airlines to their matching major airlines since we only consider codesharing between major 
carriers.  For example, SkyWest (OO) operates on a regional airline level, and feeds passengers 
to United Airlines (UA), US Airways (US), and Delta Airlines (DL).   Therefore, SkyWest needs 
to be recoded to take the code of the major airline to which it feeds passengers for the itinerary 
under consideration. We do this recoding to all operating carriers that are feeder, regional, or 
subsidiary airlines for each coupon in the datasets.  Even though this is a tedious process that 
takes time, doing so lets us accurately identify codeshare products between major carriers.  The 
summary statistics of above-mentioned variables are shown in Table 2.4. We use the consumer 
price index with a base year of 2005 to convert prices into constant year 2005 dollars.
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 Due to the fact that population magnitudes are significantly larger than quantity sold for any given air travel 
product, observed product shares, computed as described above,  are extremely small numbers.  We therefore scale 
up all product shares in the data by a common factor.  The common factor is the largest integer such that the outside 
good share (     ∑   
 
   ) in each market remains positive. The common factor that satisfies these conditions is 
183 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and 62 in the “ATI Event Sample”. 
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Table 2.4 Summary Statistics  
Variables 
“oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Fare
a 
1,025.298 1043.988 110.003 11,997.06 1,094.031 1,012.379 86.240 8,992.601 
Quantity 6.495 38.496 1 3,210 5.401 38.477 1 3,279 
Opres 25.007 33.258 0 186 30.482 45.248 0 261 
Opres_cost 25.002 28.861 0 143 26.354 33.908 0 172 
Nonstop going 0.047 0.212 0 1 0.041 0.199 0 1 
Nonstop coming 0.049 0.215 0 1 0.039 0.195 0 1 
Distance going 4,016.996 2,462.371 96 16,619 4,121.875 2,455.821 96 17,801 
Distance coming 4019.531 2,465.869 96 13,933 4,126.352 2,458.620 96 17,457 
Inconvenience going 1.071 0.131 1 2.346 1.076 0.138 1 2.541 
Inconvenience coming 1.072 0.134 1 2.808 1.078 0.142 1 2.789 
Traditional_I_going 0.157 0.364 0 1 0.173 0.378 0 1 
Traditional_II_going 1.88E-04 0.014 0 1 0.003 0.054 0 1 
Traditional_I_coming 0.156 0.363 0 1 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Traditional_II_coming 3.58E-04 0.019 0 1 0.003 0.057 0 1 
Virtual_going 0.015 0.123 0 1 0.019 0.137 0 1 
Virtual_coming 0.016 0.126 0 1 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Observed Product Shares (Sj) 0.003 0.012 
2.27E-
05 0.924 0.001 0.004 
7.52E-
06 0.437 
Number of products 164,908 
   
333,450 
   Number of markets 55,641 
   
84,740 
              Notes: 
a 
The variable “Fare” in both samples is measured in constant year 2005 dollars based on the consumer price index. 
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 4. Model 
 4.1 Demand 
In the spirit of Peters (2006) and Berry and Jia (2010), we model air travel demand using 
a nested logit framework.  Suppose in a market there are J differentiated air travel products, j = 
1,…,J, and one outside good/option, j = 0, e.g. driving, taking a train, or not traveling at all.  All 
products may be purchased by POP potential consumers.  In our nested logit model, we classify 
products into G+1 groups, g = 0, 1,…, G, where the outside good is the only good in group 0.  
Groups are defined by ticketing carriers in this study, so products with the same ticketing carrier 
belong to the same group.  The level of utility consumer c will obtain from choosing product j is 
as follows: 
                             (   )   
 ,      (1) 
where    is the mean level of utility across consumers that purchase product j,     is a random 
component of utility that is common to all products in group g, and    
  is consumer c’s 
unobserved utility, specific to product j.  The parameter   lies between 0 and 1 and measures the 
correlation of consumers’ utility across products belonging to the same group.  As   approaches 
1, the correlation of preferences across products within the same group increases.  In contrast, as 
  decreases, the correlation of preferences across commonly grouped products decreases.  Since 
products are grouped by ticketing airlines, an estimate of   reveals the extent to which 
consumers’ preferences are correlated across products offered by the same airline.  The reason 
we choose ticketing airlines as groups is that passengers might prefer to buy flight tickets from 
particular airlines because of loyalty due to previous experience or membership in the airlines’ 
frequent-flyer program. 
The mean level of utility across consumers that purchase product j is specified as: 
 
       
                                  𝑣                         
  𝑣              , 
(2) 
 
where    and    are respectively a vector of observed non-price product characteristics and the 
price of product j;             is a time period zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 only 
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during time periods after occurrence of the event, where the event is either the implementation of 
the oneworld alliance, or the grant of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance; 
 𝑣           is a zero-one airline dummy variable that equals 1 when the airline is a direct 
member of the event being analyzed; and    represents a composite of a product’s characteristics 
that are observed by consumers and airlines, but unobserved to us the researchers.    ,   ,   , 
   and    are parameters to be estimated. 
Key parameters of interest in the mean utility function (equation (2)) are:   ,    and   .  
   measures the extent to which mean utility changes across pre-post event periods for products 
offered by airlines that are not direct members of the event.     measures whether products 
offered by event members yield persistently different mean utility to consumers, irrespective of 
the event, compared to the mean utility yielded from products offered by other airlines.  Last, 
across the pre-post event periods,    measures the extent to which mean utility obtained from 
consuming products offered by event members changes, relative to the change in mean utility 
from consuming products offered by other airlines.  Therefore,    captures how the event 
differentially influences mean utility, and consequently demand for event members’ products. 
The nested logit model assumes that the random terms     and    
  have distributions such 
that      (   )   
  has the extreme value distribution.  The demand,   , for product j is 
simply given by:  
      (       
 )     ,                                                  (3) 
where POP is a measure of market size, which we assume to be the total number of 
potential consumers (measured by population) in the origin city, and    (       
 )  is the 
predicted product share function.
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    (         ) is the vector of demand parameters to be 
estimated. 
 4.2 Supply 
Codeshare agreements commonly require that the ticketing carrier markets and sets the 
final price for the round-trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for operating services 
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 In case of the nested logit model it is well known that the predicted product share 
function takes the following functional form:    
    (
  





   
  ∑   
    
   
, where    ∑     
  
   
     . 
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provided.  However, partner airlines do not publicize what mechanism they use for compensating 
each other for transportation services provided on codeshare products.  Furthermore, agreed upon 
compensation mechanisms may even vary across partners.  Therefore, the challenge we face as 
researchers is to specify a modeling approach that captures our basic understanding of what is 
commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works without imposing too much structure 
on a contracting process about which we have few facts.   
We follow Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013) and specify a codeshare agreement 
as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners (   ), where   is a per-passenger 
price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while   
represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners that determines how the joint surplus 
is distributed.  For the purpose of this paper, we do not need to econometrically identify an 
equilibrium value of  .  However, in describing the dynamic part of the model, we do show 
where   enters the model. 
Suppose that the final price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential 
price-setting game.  In the first stage of the sequential process the operating carrier sets price for 
transporting a passenger,  , and privately makes this price known to its partner ticketing carrier.  
In the second stage, given the price   that will be paid to the operating carrier, the ticketing 
carrier sets the final round-trip price    for the codeshare product.  The final subgame in this 
sequential price-setting game is played between ticketing carriers, and produces the final ticket 
prices observed by consumers. 
Let each airline/ticketing carrier offer a set      of products for sale to consumers in 
market m during period t.  Across these products, airline i effectively solves the following 
optimization problem:  
                    [∑ (          )          ],                           (4) 
where       is the variable profit carrier   obtains in market m during period t, and     ,     , 
and      represent, respectively, price, quantity sold, and marginal cost of product j in market 
m during period t. 
Let         index the corresponding operating carriers.  If product   is a traditional 
codeshare product, then           
      
 
, where     
  is the marginal cost that ticketing 
carrier   incurs by using its own plane to transport passengers on some segment(s) of the trip 
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needed for product  , while     
 
 is the price ticketing carrier   pays to operating carrier   for its 
transportation services on the remaining trip segment(s).  If instead product   is a virtual 
codeshare product, then           
 
, where     
 
 is the price the ticketing carrier pays to 
operating carrier   for its exclusive transportation services in the provision of product  .32  Last, 
if product   is a pure online product, then          
 .  In the case of a pure online product, the 
ticketing carrier is also the sole operating carrier of product  , i.e.,    . 
Note that     
  is the per-passenger expenses directly incurred by ticketing carrier   when 
it uses its own plane(s) to transport passengers on a subset of the trip segments of product  , 
while     
 
 is positively correlated with per-passenger expenses incurred by operating carrier   
when it contributes operating services to product  .  In the first stage of the sequential price-
setting game, operating carriers each optimally choose     
 
, i.e., each operating carrier   solves 
the following profit maximization problem:   
    
 [∑ (    
 
     
 
)        ], where    is the 
set of products in the market to which carrier   contributes its transportation services, while     
 
 
is the marginal cost that carrier   incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services 
to product  .  In equilibrium, the profit maximizing choice of     
 
 across competing operating 
carriers yields a positive correlation between     
 
 and     
 
.  Therefore, both     
  and     
 
  are 
a function of factors that influence the marginal cost of operating carriers. As such, when we 
subsequently specify a parametric marginal cost function for econometric estimation,      will 
be a function of factors that influence the marginal cost of operating carriers. 
In equilibrium, the amount of product   an airline sells is equal to the quantity demand, 
that is,          (       
 )     .  The optimization problem in (4) yields the following 
set of J first-order conditions – one for each of the J products in the market: 
   ∑ (      )
   
   
    
                   .                           (5) 
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 We implicitly assume here that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs fixed expenses in 
marketing the product to potential passengers. 
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We have dropped the time and market subscripts in equation (5) only to avoid a clutter of 
notation.  Using matrix notation, the system of first-order conditions in equation (5) is 
represented by: 
  (    )  (    )   ,                                             (6) 
where s, p, and mc are J×1 vectors of predicted product shares, product prices, and marginal 
costs respectively, Ω is a J×J matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that describes 
ticketing carriers’ ownership structure of the J products,    is the operator for element-by-
element matrix multiplication, and Δ is a J×J matrix of first-order derivatives of product market 
shares with respect to prices, where element     
   
   
.  Because the ticketing carrier is 
considered the “owner” of a product, in the discussion that follows, “airline” is synonymous with 
ticketing carrier. 
 Note that the structure of matrix  effectively determines groups of products in a market 
that are jointly priced.  If distinct airlines that offer products in a market non-cooperatively set 
their product prices, then the structure of  is determined by Bi for all i in market m.  However, 
if subsets of these airlines have ATI, then ATI partners will jointly/cooperatively set prices in the 
market, and consequently the structure of  is based on product-groupings according to subsets 
of ATI partners rather than Bi.  During various periods in our data, members of SkyTeam and 
Star alliances have ATI, and the structure of  takes this into account.
33
  Of course  also takes 
into account that oneworld alliance members presumably non-cooperatively priced their products 
during periods before ATI was granted to them, but cooperatively priced their products after ATI 
is granted.  
Re-arranging equation (6), we can obtain a vector of product markups: 
    (      )        (    )    .                                (7) 
Using the estimated product-level markups from equation (7), product-level marginal costs are 
recovered by: 
   ̂        ̂,                                                       (8) 
where  ̂ is the vector of estimated marginal costs for all products. 
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 Carve-outs are markets in which authorities forbid joint pricing of products by ATI members.  We assume that 
ATI members do not jointly price in carve-out markets, and therefore  takes carve-out markets into account.  
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Finally, with the estimated markups from equation (7), firm-level variable profits can be 
computed by: 
      ∑        (      ̂)          .                               (9) 
 4.3 Dynamic Entry/Exit model 
 Specification of dynamic model 
In the dynamic entry/exit game, at the end of every period, airlines decide on the set of 
markets in which to offer products during the next period.  Airlines make such forward-looking 
and strategic decisions to maximize their expected discounted inter-temporal profits in each 
market: 
  (∑  
        
 
   ),                                                 (10) 
where   (   ) is the discount factor, and          is the per-period profit of airline   in origin-
destination market m.  Per-period profit is equal to variable profit minus per-period fixed cost of 
being active in a market, and minus the one-time entry cost of starting to offer products in a 
market for the first time: 
                      {          
   (      )[          
  ]},                   (11) 
where      is a zero-one indicator variable that equals 1 only if airline i makes decision in period 
t to be active in market m during period t+1; and       is the variable profit of airline i in origin-
destination market m during period t that is computed from the Nash equilibrium price-setting 
game discussed previously. An airline is viewed as active in a market when it actually sells 
products to consumers even though a subset of those products may use the operating services of 
the airline’s partner carriers. 
      and       are deterministic parts of the fixed and entry costs functions, 
respectively.  These deterministic parts of the cost functions are common knowledge for all 
airlines.      
   and     
   represent private information shocks to fixed and entry costs respectively, 
and             . The composite shock          
   (      )    
   is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) over airlines, markets, and time period based on a 
specific probability distribution function, which we assume is the type 1 extreme value 
distribution.  
The deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs are specified as: 
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   𝑣             
   
               𝑣                           
(12) 
          
     
                  
                
   𝑣             
   
               𝑣                            
(13) 
     
where             is a time period zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 only during time 
periods after occurrence of the event, where the event is either the implementation of the 
oneworld alliance, or the grant of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance; and 
 𝑣              is a zero-one airline dummy variable that equals 1 when the airline is a 
member of the event being analyzed. 
The vector of parameters to be estimated in the dynamic model is as follows: 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    ,                           (14) 
where   
   and   
   respectively measure mean fixed and entry costs across airlines, markets and 
time;
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   and   
   respectively measure the effect that origin airport presence has on fixed and 
entry costs;   
   and   
   respectively measure the extent to which fixed and entry cost change 
across pre-post event periods for airlines that are not members of the event;   
   and    
   
respectively measure the extent to which event members fixed and entry costs persistently differ 
from other airlines’ fixed and entry costs;   
   and   
   respectively measure the extent to which 
event members fixed and entry costs change, relative to these cost changes for other airlines, 
across the pre-post event periods.  
Note that the mean recurrent fixed cost parameter   
   may comprise fixed expenses 
incurred by a ticketing carrier when the carrier markets a codeshare product to potential 
consumers.  We previously stated that (   ) represents a privately negotiated codeshare contract 
between partner carriers, where   is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an 
operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while   represents a potential lump-sum transfer 
                                                 
34
 We do not estimate airline-specific effects in the fixed and entry cost functions.  One reason is that adding 
individual airline fixed effects substantially increases the number of parameters to be estimated, which substantially 
increases computation time to estimate the dynamic model.  It takes about two weeks for our program to optimize 
the dynamic estimation even with only 10 parameters to be estimated in our specifications.  However, the fixed and 
entry cost functions do capture some heterogeneity across airlines via the airline-specific variable              . 
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between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  Our previous discussion 
also shows that   enters the effective marginal cost of the ticketing carrier.  However, the lump-
sum transfer between partners,  , is nested in   
  , but we do not attempt to separately identify   
since knowing its value is not essential for the purposes of our paper. 
 Reducing the dimensionality of the state space 
Let 
    
              .                                                     (15) 
The (x, ξ) in equation (9) are state variables that will be present in the dynamic entry/exit game.  
As Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) points out,     
  aggregates these state variables through 
equation (9) and (15) so that these state variables do not need to enter the dynamic game 
individually, which considerably reduces the dimensionality of the state space.  Therefore, 
following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we just treat     
  as a firm-specific state variable, 
rather than treating x and ξ separately.  
The payoff-relevant information of airline i in origin-destination market m during period t 
will be the following:  
               
                            .                                (16) 
 Value Function and Bellman Equation 
Let       (         )                       be a set of strategy functions, 
one for each airline.    is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) if the profile of strategies in   
maximizes the expected profit of airline i at each possible state (         ) given the opponent’s 
strategy. 
Let   
 (      ) be the value function for airline i given that the other airlines behave 
according to their respective strategies in  .  The value function is the unique solution to the 
Bellman equation: 
  
 (      )       
         
    
 (      )           
                       ∫   
 (          )    (     )  
 (           ) ,      
  (17)      
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where    
 (      ) and   
 (           ) are the expected one-period profit and expected transition 
of state variables, respectively, for airline i given the strategies of the other airlines.  A MPE in 
this model is a set of strategy functions   such that for any airline i and at every state:  
  (      )  
      
   
    
 (      )            ∫  
 (          )    (     )  
 (           ) .                          
(18) 
 
Transition rules for state variables are described in Appendix E.  In Appendix F we 
illustrate that the MPE can also be represented as a vector of conditional choice probabilities 
(CCPs) that solves the fixed point problem    (   ) , where 
     ( )                          (   )       (   )  is a vector of best response 
probability mapping, where  ( ) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution. 
 5. Estimation 
 5.1 Demand Estimation 
Our demand estimation strategy is to solve for the set of demand parameter values that 
equate observed product shares,     , with predicted product shares,     (       
 ) , i.e., 
demand parameter estimates must satisfy: 
         (       
 )                                                     (19) 
Given that the functional form for the right-hand-side of equation (19) is based on the nested 
logit, we have the following well-known estimation equation [see Berry (1994)]: 
         
  (    )    (    )           
            (      )                
   𝑣                          𝑣                               
                  , 
  (20) 
 
where      is the observed share of the outside good;        is the observed product share within 
group g; and           ,         ,         and       are fixed effects for ticketing carrier, 
time period, market origin, and market destination respectively. 
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We use two-stage-least squares (2SLS) to estimate equation (20) to deal with the 
endogeneity of      and       .  The endogeneity problem exists because the product price      
and within group product share        are correlated with the error term     .  Therefore, an 
application of valid instruments is necessary.  Valid instruments should be correlated with      
and       , but uncorrelated with     . 
 Instruments for endogenous variables in demand equation 
The instruments used in the demand estimation for “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI 
Event Sample” are: (1) the number of competitors’ products in the market; (2) the number of 
competing products offered by other carriers with equivalent number of intermediate stops on the 
departing and returning legs of the trip respectively; (3) the number of other products offered by 
an airline in a market; (4) the interaction between jet fuel price
35
 and itinerary distance for the 
departing and returning legs of the trip respectively; (5) the sum of the “Inconvenience” variable 
by ticketing carriers within a market on the departing and returning legs of the trip; (6) the sum 
of products’ number of intermediate stops by ticketing carriers within a market on the departing 
and returning legs of the trip. 
Instrument (1) and (2) measure the degree of market competition facing a product, which 
affect the size of product markup.  A firm typically can achieve a marginally higher markup on a 
given product the more substitute products it owns in the market, which is the rationale for 
instrument (3).  The rationale for instrument (4) is due to the fact that jet fuel price and itinerary 
distance are correlated with marginal cost of providing the product which in turn affect its price.  
Instruments (5) and (6) may in part explain why passengers choose one airline to some others 
and thus they are likely correlated with within group share       .  
The instruments rely on the fact that the menu of products offered by airlines in a market 
is predetermined at the time of shocks to demand, which implies that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with     .  Furthermore, unlike price and within group product share, the menu of 
products offered and their associated non-price characteristics are not routinely and easily 
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changed during a short period of time, which mitigates the influence of demand shocks on the 
menu of products offered and their non-price characteristics.    
 5.2 Marginal Cost Function Estimation 
Our specification of the marginal cost function is as follows: 
     ̂                             𝑣                            
    𝑣                                                  , 
   (21) 
where the dependent variable,     ̂ , is first recovered based on the Nash equilibrium price-
setting game by subtracting estimated product markups from prices (see equations (7) and (8)); 
     is a vector of variables that shift marginal cost;           
   is an airline-specific 
component of marginal cost captured by operating carrier group fixed effect; and      is an 
unobserved component of marginal cost.  We estimate the marginal cost function using ordinary 
least squares. 
Given that             is the dummy variable that equals 1 during post-Event time 
periods, parameter   , which is the coefficient on            , measures how marginal cost 
changes across pre-post event periods for products offered by airlines that are not direct members 
of the event.  Parameter   , which is the coefficient on Event_Members, measures whether 
products offered by event members have persistently different marginal cost, irrespective of the 
event, compared to the marginal cost of products offered by other airlines. Parameter   , which 
is the coefficient on interaction variable              𝑣           , measures the extent to 
which marginal cost of products offered by event members changes across the pre-post event 
periods, relative to change in marginal cost of products offered by other airlines.  Therefore,    
captures how the event differentially influences marginal cost of event members’ products. 
 5.3 Dynamic Model Estimation 
The datasets used for estimating the short-run demand and supply are at the product-
market-time period level.  However, for estimating the dynamic entry/exit model, the data need 
to be aggregated up to the airline-market-time period level.  Since the datasets contain too many 
airlines for the dynamic model to handle, we need to appropriately group some airlines to make 
estimation of the dynamic model feasible.  For the “oneworld Event Sample”, some airlines are 
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grouped resulting into the following 7 distinct entry/exit decision-making units in the dynamic 
model: oneworld alliance members; Continental; Delta; Northwest; United; US Airways; and all 
other airlines.  For the “ATI Event Sample”, we have the following 6 distinct entry/exit decision-
making units: oneworld ATI members, Continental, Delta, United, US Airways, all other 
airlines. 
In order to estimate the dynamic entry/exit model, we need to know whether an airline is 
effectively active or not in each market.  Similar to Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), a number-of-
passengers threshold is used to determine activity of each airline in each market.  We define an 
airline to be active in an origin-destination market during a quarter if the airline’s number of 
passengers in the quarter averages to at least 1 passengers per week.
36
  Based on this defined 
market activity information, we are able to identify the markets that each carrier enters and exits 
during the quarter.  Knowing the entry and exit decisions is essential for us to estimate fixed and 
entry costs in the sense that the dynamic model is based on the assumption that potential entrants 
decide to enter a market only when the one-time entry cost is less than the expected discounted 
future stream of profits, and incumbents decide to exit the market when per-period fixed cost 
exceeds the per-period variable profit and thus the expected discounted future stream of profits 
are not positive. 
To estimate the dynamic model, we consider the following pseudo log likelihood 
function: 
 (   )  ∑ ∑ ∑ {
      [ ( ̃   
 ( )     ̃   
 ( ))]
 (      )  [ (  ̃   
 ( )     ̃   
 ( ))]
}    
 
   
 
   , (22) 
where the conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) in vector  , which are used for computing 
 ̃   
 ( )  and  ̃   
 ( )  (see Appendix F), are arbitrary and do not represent the equilibrium 
probabilities associated with   in the model.  
We apply the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimation algorithm discussed in 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) and Aguirregabia and Mira (2002 and 2007), but we begin with 
the Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimation procedure.  The PML estimation algorithm 
requires two steps.  In step 1, we estimate relevant state transition equations and compute 
                                                 
36
 Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) define the airline to be active in a market each quarter when the number of 
passengers is 260 or more in a non-directional market per quarter (20 passengers per week). 
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nonparametric estimates of the choice probabilities  ̂ .  By estimating the state transition 
equations, we are able to construct state transition probability matrices   𝑦
 ( )  and   𝑦
 ( ) .  
Nonparametric probability estimates are used to construct consistent estimates of  ̃   
 ̂  and  ̃   
  ̂  
as described in Appendix F.  With   𝑦
 ( ),   𝑦
 ( ),  ̃   
 ̂  and  ̃   
  ̂ , we can construct the pseudo 
log likelihood function,  (   ̂ ).  
In step 2, the vector of parameters  ̂    is estimated by:  
 ̂           
 
 (   ̂ ) .                                            (23) 
Step 2 is computationally straightforward since it only involves estimation of a standard discrete 
choice logit model.  In addition, the PML algorithm does not require solving for an equilibrium 
in the dynamic game, which reduces computational burden. However, the nonparametric 
estimation of  ̂  might be inconsistent due to serial correlation or time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity [Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012)]. In addition, the expected value of the nonlinear 
objective function of  ̂  is not equal to the value of the objective function evaluated at the 
expected value of  ̂ , leading to bias of the two-step estimator  ̂   . 
The NPL algorithm applies a recursive K-step extension of the PML estimation.  Since 
we have the two-step estimator  ̂    and the initial nonparametric estimates of CCPs,  ̂ , we can 
construct new CCP estimates,  ̂ , using the best response CCPs equation  ̂   ( ̂   ̂   ).  We 
then maximize the pseudo log likelihood function, where the function is constructed using  ̂ , 
i.e. we solve the following problem:  ̂         
 
 (   ̂ ).  This process will be repeated K 
times to obtain  ̂         
 
 (   ̂   ) and  ̂   ( ̂     ̂ ).  The algorithm comes to an 
end on the K
th
 iteration in which the choice probability vector  ̂  is sufficiently close to  ̂    
based on a tolerance level that we chose.  Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) show that the 
NPL algorithm reduces the finite sample bias of the two-step PML estimator. 
 6. Estimation Results 
 6.1 Results from Demand Estimation 
Table 2.5 reports demand estimation results for the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI 
Event Sample” using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and 2SLS.  Since it is likely that 
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variables Fare and within group share are endogenous, we implement a Hausman test to confirm 
their endogeneity.  Based on the results of the Hausmam test shown in Table 2.5, we easily reject 
that Fare and within group share are exogenous at conventional levels of statistical significance.  
Therefore, the following discussion is based on the results from 2SLS. 
In Table 2.5, we have a negative coefficient estimate for variable Fare in both datasets, 
implying that price has a negative effect on consumers’ utility.  This is expected because, 
assuming all non-price product characteristic are held constant, passengers should prefer 
itineraries with a cheaper price.  We estimate that the coefficient on within group share 
  (      ) for both datasets are greater than zero with statistical significance, implying that 
consumers’ choice behavior do display airline-loyalty to some degree.  However, due to the 
coefficient’s closer proximity to 0 rather than 1, the degree of airline-loyalty is not strong.  
It is estimated that Opres_demand has a positive effect on consumers’ utility, which is 
what we expect, since travelers are likely to prefer the products offered by airlines that provide 
services to more destinations from the travelers’ origin airport. The intuition is that the value of 
an airline’s frequent-flyer program (FFP) to residents of an origin city increases as the number of 
destinations the airline offers nonstop flight to leaving from the travelers’ origin airport increases, 
thus increasing loyalty to the airline. 
For both Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming, the estimated coefficients are positive, 
implying passengers prefer itineraries with a nonstop flight to their destination and nonstop flight 
back to their origin.  Moreover, as expected, Inconvenience_going and Inconvenience_coming 
have negative effects on consumers’ utility in the sense that passengers would choose the 
itinerary that uses the most convenient routing in terms of travel distance covered.   
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               *** statistically significant at 1% level 
               **   statistically significant at 5% level 
               *     statistically significant at 10% level 
  Table 2.5 Demand Estimation 
  
Variables 
“oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Fare -1.82E-05*** 1.90E-06 -0.004*** 3.57E-04 -1.19E-05*** 1.22E-06 -0.002*** 9.24E-05 
  (      ) 0.462*** 0.002 0.109*** 0.018 0.419*** 0.001 0.211*** 0.007 
Opres_demand 0.008*** 9.70E-05 0.011*** 7.90E-04 0.005*** 4.40E-05                                                                                                                                                                          0.006*** 1.91E-04
Nonstop_going 0.711*** 0.014 0.705*** 0.054 0.830*** 0.009 0.817*** 0.022 
Nonstop_coming 0.674*** 0.013 0.449*** 0.056 0.828*** 0.010 0.825*** 0.022 
Inconvenience_going -0.568*** 0.021 -0.809*** 0.090 -0.444*** 0.012 -0.491*** 0.037 
Inconvenience_coming -0.501*** 0.021 -0.740*** 0.092 -0.424*** 0.011 -0.522*** 0.036 
Traditional_I_going -0.243*** 0.007 -0.206*** 0.036 -0.203*** 0.004 -0.057*** 0.015 
Traditional_II_going -0.527*** 0.076 1.095 1.115 -0.228*** 0.020 -0.151** 0.076 
Traditional_I_coming -0.224*** 0.007 -0.095*** 0.038 -0.175*** 0.003 0.038** 0.017 
Traditional_II_coming -0.444*** 0.078 -0.495 0.423 -0.172*** 0.019 -0.051 0.071 
Virtual_going -0.642*** 0.018 -0.693*** 0.080 -0.472*** 0.009 -0.387*** 0.029 
Virtual_coming -0.604*** 0.017 -0.416*** 0.085 -0.462*** 0.009 -0.121*** 0.031 
T ost Ev nt 0.033*** 0.005 -0.489*** 0.055 0.006** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.009 
Event_Member 1.355*** 0.138 0.903*** 0.311 0.783*** 0.256 1.504** 0.778 
T ost Ev nt
 E        b   -0.056*** 0.010 0.070* 0.040 -0.062*** 0.007 -0.048*** 0.019 
Spring (Summer) 0.066*** 0.004 -0.036** 0.019 -0.059*** 0.002 0.040*** 0.008 
Constant -7.290*** 0.217 4.578** 2.122 -8.457*** 0.278 -5.903*** 0.906  
Tkcarriers fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Market Destination fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
  
 
      
  
    
R-squared 0.7179 - 0.7733 - 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-
sq test 8027.75 (p = 0.0000) 17348.2 (p = 0.0000) 
Robust regression F test 4335.83 (p = 0.0000) 9924.88 (p = 0.0000) 
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The coefficients on the codeshare dummy variables provide a comparison with respect to 
pure online products.  Most of these coefficients are shown to be negative in both datasets, 
implying that consumers less prefer codeshare itineraries to pure online itineraries.  Pure online 
products are viewed to be of higher quality than codeshare products in the sense that an airline 
can better organize its own flights to streamline connection schedules and arrange gates to reduce 
layover time.  Even though traditional codeshare partners try to organize and coordinate their 
gates and flight schedules, the estimates suggest that they do not perform as well as pure online 
providers.  Ito and Lee (2007) argue that passengers perceive virtual codeshare product as an 
inferior substitute to an otherwise equivalent pure online product since the frequent-flyer 
programs often do not allow upgrade of a virtual codeshare ticket to first class. 
For the “oneworld Event Sample”, coefficient estimate on              𝑣           
is positive and statistically significant at 10%.  This suggests that formation of the oneworld 
alliance raises demand for the alliance members.  Relatively more passengers would like to fly 
with oneworld alliance members in the post-alliance period, perhaps because consumers expect 
to enjoy more privileges and thus the alliance increases the value to consumers of holding FFP 
membership with a oneworld airline.  However, in the “ATI Event Sample”, the coefficient 
estimate on              𝑣           is negative and statistically significant. This result 
suggests that the subsequent grant of ATI decreases demand for the ATI members.  
The mean of own-price elasticities that the demand model yields are 3.85 in the 
“oneworld Event Sample” and 2.77 in “ATI Event Sample”.  Own-price elasticity estimates from 
our model are in the “ballpark” and consistent with estimates from other airline industry studies.  
For example, Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986) and Brander and Zhang (1990) find own-price 
elasticity in the airline industry ranging from -1.2 to -2.0, Berry and Jia (2010) find own-price 
elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their year 2006 sample, while Peters (2006) 
study of the airline industry produces own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6. 
 6.2 Recovered Marginal Costs, Markups and Computed Variable Profits 
Information with regards to marginal costs, prices, markups, and variable profits may 
reveal more about market competitiveness. Based on equation (7), combined with demand 
parameter estimates shown in Table 2.5, product markups can be computed and then marginal 
costs consequently recovered by subtracting markups from prices.  
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The mean prices are $1,025.30 and $1,094.03 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI 
Event Sample” respectively, while mean product markups are $283.35 and $453.65 respectively.  
Recall that all monetary variables in both datasets are measured with respect to year 2005 
constant dollars.  The Lerner Index, which is the ratio of product markup to price, is a well-
known measure of market power.  The overall mean Lerner Indexes are 48.79% in the “oneworld 
Event Sample” and 56.95% in the “ATI Event Sample”. 
We implement a counterfactual experiment in which the markups are re-calculated based 
on the assumption that oneworld ATI was not approved, i.e., members cannot cooperatively 
price their products in a given market.  The counterfactual experiment focuses on the markets 
where ATI carrier members each provide substitute products, i.e., markets in which their service 
overlap.  Comparing actual markups in the post-ATI period to the counterfactual ones, we find 
that the mean markup of products offered by the ATI members would only be 0.14% lower if 
cooperative pricing among the members were forbidden.  Such small changes in markups make 
us believe that the approval of oneworld ATI has not resulted in significant competitive harm. 
The quarterly market-level variable profits of each airline can be computed using 
equation (9).  Since variable profit is a state variable in our dynamic entry/exit model, it is 
essential to have variation of this variable.  We find that product markups do not vary much 
across airlines, but we do have cross-airline variation in market-level variable profits.  The 
sources of the cross-airline variation in variable profits are the cross-airline variation in number 
of passengers per product, as well as cross-airline variation in number of products sold per 
market.  The overall mean quarterly airline market-level variable profit is $19,648.82 in the 
“oneworld Event Sample”, and $31,752.06 in the “ATI Event Sample”, and the overall median 
variable profits are $7,158.19 and $11,755.13 respectively. 
It is useful at this point to put in context the magnitudes of quarterly market-level 
variable profit estimates.  Recall that the original database, before any cleaning, is only a 10% 
sample of air travel tickets sold.  This implies that the magnitudes of variable profit estimates are 
at most roughly 10% of actual variable profits. 
 6.3 Results from Markup function and Marginal Cost function Estimation 
Table 2.6 presents the OLS estimates of an equation in which we regress computed 
product markups on various determinants of product markup. The coefficient estimate on 
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Opres_demand has the expected positive sign with statistical significance.  A rationale for this 
estimated effect is that an airline usually has greater market power at its hub airport where it 
typically has large presence.  
 
 Table 2.6 Markup Estimation 
  “oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Opres_demand 0.064*** 0.002 0.021*** 3.33E-04 
Nonstop_going 4.453*** 0.469 2.702*** 0.160 
Nonstop_coming 4.384*** 0.456 1.877*** 0.125 
Inconvenience_going -0.735*** 0.400 -0.901*** 0.309 
Inconvenience_coming 0.122 0.401 -0.909*** 0.298 
Close_comp_going -0.021 0.014 0.002 0.005 
Close_comp_coming -0.022 0.014 -0.017*** 0.006 
Traditional_1_going -0.652*** 0.082 -0.008 0.048 
Traditional_2_going -1.863*** 0.627 -0.082 0.107 
Traditional_1_coming -0.406*** 0.079 0.012 0.051 
Traditional_2_coming -0.869 0.591 0.117 0.109 
Virtual_going -3.130*** 0.230 -0.827*** 0.066 
Virtual_coming -3.033*** 0.228 -0.600*** 0.061 
T ost Ev nt 0.744*** 0.055 -0.052 0.047 
Event_Member -2.395* 1.347 0.900*** 0.372 
T ost Ev nt  E        b   -0.305 0.267 -0.111* 0.064 
Market_Overlap_ATI_tkcarriers - - 0.208*** 0.061 
T ost Ev nt  E        b  
                 T             - - 0.357*** 0.083 
Constant 282.059*** 1.632 447.672*** 2.092 
Ticketing carriers fixed effects YES YES 
Season effect YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effect YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effect YES YES 
          
R-squared 0.1715 0.1915 
          *** statistically significant at 1%  
          **  statistically significant at 5%  
          *    statistically significant at 10% 
 
For both datasets, it is estimated that the nonstop dummy variables are associated with 
higher markups, which is what we expect because consumers prefer nonstop flight to get to their 
destination and back, and therefore are willing to pay higher price for this itinerary travel 
convenience.  When the coefficients on the inconvenience variables have statistically significant 
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effect on markup, the effect is negative as expected.  These results largely suggest that airlines 
are more likely to charge lower markups when itineraries use less convenient routing for 
passengers in terms of miles flown in excess of the possible minimum flight miles needed.  
Close_comp_going and Close_comp_coming measure the number of competing products 
offered by other carriers with equivalent number of intermediate stops for the departing and 
returning legs of the trip respectively.  We find that only Close_comp_coming has a statistically 
significant coefficient for the “ATI Event Sample”.  The estimated negative effect on markup is 
consistent with expectation, because these variables measure the level of market competition a 
product faces.  
Examining the effect of codeshare on markups, we notice that the coefficients of these 
variables in Table 2.6 are mostly negative and statistically significant.  Overall, these results 
suggest that airlines charge lower markups for codeshare products compared to pure online 
products. Consumers less prefer both traditional and virtual codeshare products to pure online 
products, and thus airlines are more likely to lower markups on codeshare products. 
The interaction variable,              𝑣          , has no effect on markups in the 
“oneworld Event Sample”, suggesting that the implementation of oneworld alliance did not 
influence market power of the oneworld members.  In the “ATI Event Sample”, we include the 
dummy variable        𝑣        𝐼           , which equals to 1 for markets in which at 
least two ATI carrier members each provide substitute products, i.e., markets in which ATI 
members’ service overlap. The interaction term 
             𝑣                   𝑣        𝐼            has a positive coefficient, 
implying that granting oneworld ATI increased the market power of the oneworld members that 
received ATI only in the overlapping markets.  However, the negative coefficient estimate on the 
two-way interaction variable              𝑣           suggests that the grant of ATI may 
have resulted in ATI members lowering markup on their products in markets where their service 
do not overlap. 
Table 2.7 provides the estimation results for the marginal cost regression based on 
equation (21).  The variable Opres_cost has a positive coefficient estimate in both samples, while 
the coefficient estimate of Opres_cost square is negative but only statistically significant in the 
“ATI Event Sample”.   Such sign pattern of these two size-of-presence variables indicates that an 
airline’s marginal cost increases initially with increases in its origin airport presence, but 
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eventually declines with further increases in the airline’s origin airport presence.  This result 
suggests that cost efficiency gains due to economy of passenger-traffic density can only be 
achieved when the size of an airline’s airport presence surpasses a certain level.  Because an 
increase in an airline’s origin airport presence facilitates the airline channeling more of its 
passengers through these airports, we believe that economy of passenger-traffic density is a key 
driver of the estimated result.  The evidence we find suggesting the presence of economy of 
passenger-traffic density is consistent with findings in Brueckner and Spiller (1994).  
 
Table 2.7 Marginal Cost Estimation 







Estimates Std. Error 
Opres_cost 2.861*** 0.414 3.668*** 0.229 
Opres_cost_square -0.003 0.003 -0.014*** 0.002 
Nonstop_going 61.636*** 14.137 26.500*** 9.808 
Nonstop_coming 13.234 13.589 28.297*** 10.323 
Distance_going 0.060*** 0.013 0.039*** 0.007 
Distance_coming 0.082*** 0.013 0.027*** 0.007 
traditional_I_going 5.184 14.457 40.585*** 8.911 
traditional_II_going 667.304** 329.922 24.603 44.232 
traditional_I_coming 39.728*** 13.795 86.664*** 8.687 
traditional_II_coming 173.730 157.308 35.111 41.631 
virtual_going -6.622 22.201 -1.188 14.670 
virtual_coming 66.884*** 22.909 103.898*** 14.844 
T ost Ev nt -154.198*** 6.023 14.622*** 4.446 
Event_Members
 
9.684 93.932 13.550 42.057 
T ost Ev nt  E        b    23.417** 11.051 -20.836*** 8.362 
Constant 1617.711*** 511.732 413.714*** 166.725 
Operating carrier group fixed 
effects YES YES 
Season effect YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effect YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effect YES YES 
          
R-squared 0.2356 0.2786 
Equations estimated using ordinary least squares.       
*** statistically significant at 1% 





The coefficient estimates suggest that the nonstop product characteristic of travel 
itineraries positively affects marginal cost of providing the air travel product.  It is possible that 
the relatively higher marginal cost when the itinerary is nonstop, is in part driven by the fact that 
products with intermediate stop(s) are better able to exploit economies of passenger-traffic 
density, especially when an intermediate stop is at a carrier’s hub airport. 
As expected, the coefficient estimates on distance variables are positive and statistically 
significant.  The results may simply be capturing the fact that covering longer distances require 
more fuel. 
In both the “oneworld Event Sample” and the “ATI Event Sample”, codeshare variables 
are either positively correlated with, or not related to, marginal cost.  In other words, relative to 
pure online itineraries, codeshare itineraries seems more costly for the airlines to provide.  A 
possible reason for the higher marginal cost is that airlines that offer traditional codeshare 
products find it costly to coordinate schedules and gates for connecting flights with their 
codeshare partners to make transfers smoother.  The evidence apparently suggests that there also 
exists some costly coordination between operating and ticketing carriers when offering virtual 
codeshare products. 
The coefficient estimate on              𝑣            is positive and statistically 
significant in the “oneworld Event Sample”, but negative and statistically significant in the “ATI 
Event Sample”.  This sign pattern of these coefficient estimates suggests that oneworld alliance 
members were not able to achieve marginal cost efficiency gains by implementing the alliance 
without ATI, but upon the subsequent grant of ATI, these ATI members were able to achieve 
marginal cost efficiency gains.  In their joint application for ATI, the oneworld members did 
suggest that the greater network integration and cooperation that ATI permits will result in 
efficiency gains.  We therefore find evidence in support of these arguments. 
Our results are consistent with the finding of Oum, Park, Kim, and Yu (2004) that airlines 
tend to enjoy higher productivity gains and profitability when they form alliances at high-level 
cooperation than when alliances are at low-level cooperation. This implies that there might be no 
productivity gains when the cooperation is too low.  Oneworld alliance without ATI involves less 
cooperation among the members than oneworld alliance with ATI in the sense that, without ATI, 
members are not allowed to jointly set prices and share revenues. 
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 6.4 Results from a Reduced-form Price Regression 
Based on standard oligopoly theory, a product’s price in equilibrium is simply the sum of 
marginal cost and markup.  Details on how markup is determined depend on details of the 
specific oligopoly model under consideration.  Therefore, equilibrium price changes should be 
driven by changes in marginal cost, changes in markup, or both. 
One attractive feature of a reduced-form price regression is that its specification and 
estimation do not require the strong assumptions on optimizing behavior of market participants 
as are required for specification and estimation of a structural model.  So results produced by a 
reduced-form price regression can serve to help put in context results from a structural model.  
However, unlike a structural model, a reduced-form price regression cannot separately identify 
changes in markup versus changes in marginal cost.  By estimating both a structural model and a 
reduced-form price regression, we are able to exploit the advantages of both empirical 
approaches to better understand the estimated market effects.      
Table 2.8 presents the estimation results of a reduced-form price regression.  The signs 
and magnitude of coefficient estimates on Opres_cost and Opres_cost_square variables in both 
dataset are similar to those in the marginal cost regression, so the fare effects of the size of an 
airline’s presence at the origin airport seem to be primarily driven by its airport presence effects 
on marginal cost.  The estimated price effects suggest that an airline’s price initially increases as 
the size of its presence at the origin airport increases, but further increases in its origin airport 
presence are associated with decreases in its price.  As we previously discussed, once an airline’s 
airport presence increases beyond a certain threshold, then the airline is better able to exploit 
economies of passenger-traffic density, causing marginal cost to fall, which apparently is 
sufficient to drive fares down. 
Most of the nonstop variables are associated with higher fares.  Results from the markup 
and marginal cost regressions both suggest that nonstop products are associated with higher 
markup and higher marginal cost, which are consistent with the estimated reduced-form fare 
effects of the nonstop variables.  
The inconvenience variables are associated with lower price.  These results are consistent 
with our previous findings that a more inconvenient travel itinerary, in terms of distance flown in 
excess of the minimum distance necessary, is associated with lower passenger utility (demand 
result), and lower markup.  As expected, the estimated coefficients on the distance variables 
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suggest that longer itinerary distances are associated with higher product price.  This makes 
sense since we found itinerary distance is positively related to marginal cost.  
 
Table 2.8 Reduced-form Price Equation Estimation 
  “oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
Variables 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Opres_cost 3.000*** 0.414 3.656*** 0.229 
Opres_cost_square -0.003 0.003 -0.014*** 0.002 
Nonstop_going 61.337*** 15.657 19.061** 10.959 
Nonstop_coming 4.003 14.982 25.430** 11.425 
Inconvenience_going -89.439*** 32.413 -95.140*** 17.941 
Inconvenience_coming -125.244*** 31.848 -50.261*** 17.364 
Distance_going 0.059*** 0.019 0.048*** 0.011 
Distance_coming 0.090*** 0.019 0.026*** 0.010 
Close_comp_going -0.288 0.897 -0.358 0.322 
Close_comp_coming -0.939 0.920 -0.086 0.322 
Traditional_I_going 6.147 14.467 39.869*** 8.951 
Traditional_II_going 671.243** 330.151 -24.451 44.221 
Traditional_I_coming 40.112*** 13.799 87.085*** 8.736 
Traditional_II_coming 172.011 157.179 35.421 41.630 
Virtual_going -8.749 22.235 -1.541 14.678 
Virtual_coming 62.820*** 22.959 103.613*** 14.850 
T ost Ev nt -152.212*** 6.052 15.421*** 4.440 
Event_Members 12.551 89.778 16.408 43.989 
T ost Ev nt  E        b    24.447** 11.039 -29.427*** 10.689 
Market_Overlap_ATI_carriers - - -10.454** 4.616 
T ost Ev nt  E        b   
                 T           - - 13.136 10.523 
Constant 2051.691*** 511.1769 959.160*** 167.695 
Operating carrier group fixed 
effects YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES 
Season fixed effect YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effect YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effect YES YES 
      
 
  
R-squared 0.2364 0.2785 
          Equations estimated using ordinary least squares. 
          *** statistically significant at 1% 
          **   statistically significant at 5% 




The variables, Close_comp_going and Close_comp_coming measure for the given 
product under consideration, the number of competing products offered by other carriers with 
equivalent number of intermediate stops on the departing and returning portions of the trip 
respectively.  The higher the measure of each of these variables for a given product, the more 
competition this product faces in the market.  There is no evidence in the reduced-form price 
regression that these variables influence price. 
Overall, it appears that codeshare itineraries are associated with higher price relative to 
pure online itineraries.  Recall that we found that codeshare itineraries are associated with lower 
markup but higher marginal cost.  So the estimated reduced-form price effect of codeshare is 
more reflective of how codesharing influences marginal cost rather than markup. 
Focusing on the interaction variable,              𝑣           , we find that 
implementation of the alliance is associated with a relative increase in prices being charged by 
alliance members. In the “ATI Event Sample, we include the dummy variable 
        𝑣        𝐼         , which equal to 1 for markets in which there exists substitute 
products that are both ticketed and operated by ATI carrier members, i.e., markets in which the 
ATI members’ service overlap.  The coefficient estimate on the three-way interaction variable, 
             𝑣                    𝑣        𝐼         , is not statistically 
significant, simply implying no effect of granting ATI on fares of products provided by its 
members in their overlapping markets.  However, the negative coefficient estimate on the two-
way interaction variable,              𝑣           , indicates that the grant of ATI to 
oneworld members appear to be associated with a relative decline in price being charged by these 
oneworld ATI members in markets where their service do not overlap.  Therefore, it seems that 
granting Antitrust Immunity brought benefits to consumers in terms of lower fares. 
In summary, this study has useful findings for policymakers in terms of effects on 
marginal costs, markups, and prices of alliance implementation with and without ATI.  The 
evidence suggests that implementation of the oneworld alliance without ATI did not yield cost 
efficiencies for the members.  However, the subsequent grant of ATI to various members of the 
oneworld alliance is associated with cost efficiency gains for the oneworld ATI members, 
perhaps owing to the greater network integration and cooperation that ATI permits.  Additionally, 
even though markup went up in ATI members’ overlapping markets, price in these markets was 
not affected. In other markets, price even went down. 
86 
 
 6.5 Result from the Dynamic Model 
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 report our recurrent fixed and market entry cost estimation 
results for the “oneworld Event Sample” and the “ATI Event Sample” respectively.  The 
quarterly discount factor, β, is fixed at 0.99, which implies an annual discount factor of 0.96.  All 
the estimated fixed and entry cost parameters are measured in ten thousands of annual 2005 
dollars. 
We begin by discussing the fixed cost results and then turn to discussing the entry cost 
results for both samples.  The estimates of parameters in the fixed cost function for the 
“oneworld Event Sample” are unreasonably small and not precisely estimated.  As such, we 
cannot draw reliable inferences about size of fixed cost in the “oneworld Event Sample”. 
However, based on the objectives of our study we are most interested in parameter estimates for 
the fixed cost and entry cost functions in the “ATI Event Sample”. 
 
Table 2.9 Estimates of Parameters in Fixed and Entry Cost Functions 
 for the “oneworld Event Sample”  
 Parameter 
Estimates 
(In ten thousand $) Std. Error 
 
T-stat 
Fixed Cost Function    
Mean fixed cost across all carriers 1.71E-07 0.0305 5.60E-06 
              -5.78E-11 4.31E-05 -1.34E-06 
               -1.62E-07 0.0489 -3.32E-06 
               -1.41E-07 0.0529 -2.66E-06 
                   1.44E-07 0.0897 1.60E-06 
    
Entry Cost Function    
Mean entry cost across all carriers 4.2200*** 0.0431 97.9504 
              -0.0078*** 2.91E-04 -26.7740 
          0.0413 0.0754 0.5484 
         -0.7109*** 0.0727 -9.7786 
                   -0.1004 0.1271 -0.7896 









Table 2.10 Estimates of Parameters in Fixed and Entry Cost Functions  
for the “ATI Event Sample” 
 Parameter 
Estimates 
(In ten thousand $) Std. Error 
 
T-stat 
Fixed Cost Function    
Mean fixed cost across all carriers 0.6560*** 0.0308 21.2921 
              -0.0038*** 2.04E-04 -18.6726 
   𝐼 0.0028 0.0345 0.0816 
  𝐼 0.1369*** 0.0472 2.8996 
   𝐼   T  -0.1398* 0.0820 -1.7038 
    
Entry Cost Function    
Mean entry cost across all carriers 3.4562*** 0.0389 88.9242 
              -0.0040*** 2.92e-04 -13.6984 
   𝐼 0.6787*** 0.0559 12.1415 
  𝐼 -0.3144*** 0.0666 -4.7233 
   𝐼   T  0.0496 0.1287 0.3855 
      *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
      * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
According to the coefficient estimate of mean fixed cost in “ATI Event Sample”, the 
mean fixed cost across all carriers is $6,560.  Based on our Nash equilibrium price-setting game 
previously discussed, the overall mean quarterly variable profits in a directional origin-
destination market are estimated to be $31,752.06.  Therefore, mean fixed costs account for 
20.66% of the variable profits in the “ATI Event Sample”. 
The variable               measures the size of an airline’s presence at the origin 
airport of the market based on the number of other U.S. domestic airports from which the airline 
has nonstop flight going to the origin airport.  The negative and statistically significant fixed cost 
coefficient estimate on               in the “ATI Event Sample” suggests that an airlines 
recurrent fixed cost is lower the larger is its presence at the origin airport of the market.  This 
result may in part reflect relatively favorable access to airport facilities (gates, check-in counters, 
etc.) that an airline enjoys at its hub airports.  In addition, an airline’s larger airport presence may 
result in it using airport facilities more intensely and efficiently.  
The fixed cost coefficient estimate on variable    𝐼 in Table 2.10 measures the extent to 
which non-ATI airlines’ fixed costs change over the pre and post-ATI periods.  This coefficient 
estimate is not statistically significant, suggesting that fixed cost for the carriers that are not 
oneworld ATI members is not different in the post- ATI period than in the pre-ATI period. 
88 
 
ATI is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the carrier is a oneworld ATI member. The positive 
fixed cost coefficient estimate on this variable suggests that fixed cost for oneworld ATI 
members is persistently higher than the mean fixed cost of other airlines.  The fixed cost 
coefficient estimate on the interaction variable,    𝐼    𝐼,  measures the fixed cost effect of 
granting ATI on ATI members’ fixed cost.  This fixed cost coefficient estimate is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that granting oneworld members ATI 
reduced these airlines quarterly fixed cost in the origin-destination markets they serve.  As such, 
there is some evidence, even though it is statistically weak, of fixed cost efficiency gains 
associated with the grant of immunity.   
We now turn to discussing results for the entry cost functions.  All variables that enter the 
entry cost functions are the same as in the fixed cost functions.  The mean entry cost across all 
carriers is $42,200 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and $34,562 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  
Based on our overall mean variable profit estimates from the Nash price-setting game, it will 
take at least 2 quarters of variable profits to recoup their one-time sunk entry cost investment. 
The entry cost function coefficient on               in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 are 
both negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an airline’s entry cost to a market 
declines the larger the airline’s presence at the origin airport of the market.  This result is 
consistent with how the literature believes airline markets work [see Berry (1992); Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008); Gayle and Wu (2013) among others]. 
The           and    𝐼  dummy variables in the entry cost functions measure how the 
market entry cost of non-alliance/ATI member airlines changes between the pre and post 
alliance/ATI periods.  Coefficient estimates on these time dummy variables suggest that non-
alliance airlines’ market entry cost did not change between the pre and post-alliance periods, 
while the entry cost of non-ATI airlines increased by $6,787 in the post-ATI period relative to 
pre-ATI period.  
Lastly, we are interested in knowing how forming oneworld alliance and granting of ATI 
affect the entry costs of alliance members and ATI members, respectively.  The results show that 
the coefficients on both                      and    𝐼    𝐼’s are not statistically significant.  
The evidence therefore suggests that the implementation of oneworld alliance in 1999 and the 
grant of oneworld ATI in 2010 had no statistically discernable impact on their members’ market 
entry costs.   
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In summary, both the implementation of the oneworld alliance and the subsequent grant 
of ATI to various members do not appear to have an impact on partners’ sunk market entry costs, 
but the grant of ATI weakly reduced their recurrent fixed cost. 
 7. Concluding Remarks 
As airline alliance members increasingly seek to achieve greater cooperation and 
consolidation of their networks, granting antitrust immunity to alliance members has become a 
controversial issue and raises much concern in policy making.  For example, the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) expressed concerns that the grant of antitrust immunity will reduce 
competition in markets where the member carriers each offer substitute service (their overlap 
markets).  Furthermore, the DOJ takes the position that immunity is not required for an alliance 
to yield benefits to consumers and partner carriers.  On the contrary, the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) takes the position that there are sufficient efficiency gains 
associated with granting carriers antitrust immunity such that, on net, consumers would 
ultimately benefit.   
Even though the literature on the price effects of granting airlines antitrust immunity is 
extensive, immunity’s separate impacts on partner carriers’ cost and markup have received little 
analysis.  However, to better evaluate the opposing policy positions taken on granting immunity, 
it is necessary to disentangle the cost effects from the markup effects.  This paper uses a 
structural econometric model to empirically investigate the impacts of implementation of an 
international airline alliance, and the subsequent grant of antitrust immunity on price, markup, 
and various measures of cost. 
One of our key findings of interest to policymakers is that implementation of the 
oneworld alliance did not have an impact on markup of products offered by the alliance 
members, while the subsequent grant of ATI to various members increased markup on their 
products in markets where ATI members each provide substitute products (their overlap 
markets), but decreased their markup in other markets.  Furthermore, we find that forming 
oneworld alliance did not create cost efficiency in terms of marginal cost, but granting oneworld 
ATI reduced its members’ marginal costs.  The reduction in marginal costs of oneworld ATI 
members puts downward pressure on prices in the short-run.  In particular, the grant of ATI to 
various members is associated with a decline in their price in markets where their services do not 
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overlap.  In markets where their service do overlap, the evidence suggest that increases in 
markup associated with the grant of ATI are sufficient to offset reductions in marginal cost such 
that prices remain unchanged.  These findings provide better support for the DOT’s policy 
position than they do for the DOJ’s policy position. 
In addition, results from the dynamic entry/exit part of the model do not provide evidence 
to counter alliance carriers’ argument that ATI is required to achieve benefits to consumers and 
alliance carriers.  Specifically, both implementation of oneworld alliance and the subsequent 
grant of ATI did not seem to impact alliance partners’ sunk market entry cost, but weakly 
decreased their recurrent fixed cost. 
In summary, evidence from evaluating the oneworld alliance suggests that the grant of 
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Appendix D - Additional Chapter 2 Tables 
  Table D.1 Oneworld Alliance Members 
Members Code Year  
Air Berlin AB 2012 
American 
Airlines AA Founder(1999) 
British Airways BA Founder(1999) 
Cathay Pacific CX Founder(1999) 
Finnair AY 1999 
Iberia IB 1999 
Japan Airlines JL 2007 
LAN LA 2000 
Qantas QF Founder(1999) 
Royal Jordanian RJ 2007 
S7 Airlines S7 2010 






























Table D.2 Timeline of  Antitrust Immunity by U.S. Carriers 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners Active time period Carve-out 
3 
Aloha Hawaiian 9/2002 - 5/2007 
 America West Royal Jordanian 1/2005 - 5/2007 
 




  LAN 9/1999 - present Miami-Santiago 
  Swissair 5/2000 - 11/2001 Chicago-Brussels 
  Sabena 5/2000 - 3/2002 Chicago-Zurich 
  Finnair 7/2002 - present 
   Swiss International Air Lines 11/2002 - 8/2005 
  SN Brussels 4/2004 - 10/2009  
  LAN and LAN-Peru* 10/2005 -present Miami-Lima 
  
British Airways, Iberia, Finnair 
and Royal Jordanian* 
7/2010 - present 
   Japan Airlines 11/2010 -present 




 Atlanta-Zurich, Atlanta-Brussels, 
Cincinnati-Zurich, New York-
Brussels, New York-Vienna, New 
York-Geneva and New York-Zurich 
  
Air France, Alitalia, Czech 
Airlines 
1/2002 - present Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-Paris 
  
Korean Air Lines, Air France, 
Alitalia and Czech Airlines* 
6/2002 - present 
   Virgin Blue Group 6/2011 
 Delta and Northwest Air France, KLM, Alitalia, 
Czech Airlines* 
5/2008 - present Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-Paris 
carve-outs removed 
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
1. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance ended on June 1, 1996. 
2. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance ended on August, 6, 2000.   

















Table D.2 Continue 
Timeline of  Antitrust Immunity by U.S. Carriers 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners Active time period Carve-out 
Northwest KLM 1/1993 
   KLM and Alitalia* 12/1999 -10/2001 
United 
Lufthansa 5/1996 Chicago-Frankfurt and 
Washington D.C.-Frankfurt 
  Lufthansa and SAS* 11/1996 - present  
  
Air Canada 9/1997 - present Chicago-Toronto and San 
Francisco-Toronto 
  
Air New Zealand 4/2001 - present Los Angeles-Auckland and Los 
Angeles-Sydney 
  
Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa and 
SAS* 
1/2001 present  
  Copa Airlines 5/2001 - present  
  




9/2007 - present  
  Asiana 5/2003 - present  
  
Lufthansa, SAS, Austrian,  British 
Midland, LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines, TAP and Air Canada* 
2/2007 - present  
  
Brussels, Lufthansa, SAS, 
Austrian,  British Midland, LOT, 
Swiss International Air Lines, TAP 
and Air Canada* 
7/2009 - present  















Table D.3 List of Ticketing Carriers in “ATI Event Sample” 
Airline Name Code Airline Name Code Airline Name Code 
LAN Argentina 4M Aer Lingus Plc EI Air New Zealand NZ 
Jet Airways (India) Limited 9W Emirates EK Olympic Airlines OA 
Aegean Airlines A3 Etihad Airways EY Czech Airlines OK 
American Airlines Inc. AA Frontier Airlines Inc. F9 Austrian Airlines OS 
Air Berlin PLC and CO AB Icelandair FI Asiana Airlines Inc. OZ 
Air Canada AC AirTran Airways Corporation FL Qantas Airways Ltd. QF 
Compagnie Nat'l Air France AF Gulf Air Company GF Qatar Airways  QR 
Aeromexico AM Hawaiian Airlines Inc. HA Alia-(The) Royal Jordanian RJ 
Aeromexpress AP Iberia Air Lines Of Spain IB South African Airways SA 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS TAM Airlines  JJ Scandinavian Airlines Sys. SK 
Royal Air Maroc AT Spanair S.A. JK Sabena Belgian World Air. SN 
Finnair Oy AY Japan Air Lines Co. Ltd. JL Sun Country Airlines SY 
Alitalia AZ Korean Air Lines Co. Ltd. KE TAP Portugal TP 
JetBlue Airways B6 Klm Royal Dutch Airlines KL ATA Airlines TZ 
British Airways Plc BA Lan-Chile Airlines.  LA USA3000 Airlines U5 
British Midland Airways Ltd. BD Lufthansa German Airlines LH United Air Lines Inc. UA 
Eva Air (Taiwan) BR Polskie Linie Lotnicze LO US Airways Inc. US 
China Airlines Ltd. CI Lan Peru LP Air Europa UX 
Compania Panamena (Copa) CM Swiss International Airlines LY Virgin Australia VA 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO Malév Hungarian Airlines MA Vietnam Airlines VN 
Cathay Pacific CX Compania Mexicana De Aviaci MX Virgin Atlantic Airways VS 
China Southern Airlines CZ North American Airlines NA ACES Colombia  VX 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL All Nippon Airways Co. NH West Jet WS 













Appendix E - Transition Rules for State Variables 
Recall that the vector of state variables shown in equation (16) is: 
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Transition rules for state variables are as follows: 
                                (E1) 
         
      (  
    
     
      
 )             (E2) 
                   
             
                            
          
   (E3) 
where     
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are assumed to be normally distributed.  
The joint transition probabilities of the state variables are determined by: 
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Appendix F - Representation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
using Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs) 
Recall that the expected one-period profit function for airline i is as follows: 
    (      )      
      (    (      )   )            (F1) 
Based on equation (C1), note that     (    )      
  and     (    )      
      
(      )   . 
Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we represent the MPE as a vector of conditional 
choice probabilities (CCPs), P = {Pi(y): for every firm and state (i, y)}, where P solves the fixed 
point problem    (   ).       (   ) is a vector of best response mapping: 
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where  ( ) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
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  and     
  are vectors of valuations that depend on CCPs and transition probabilities, but not 
on the dynamic parameters being estimated. Since      is assumed type 1 extreme value 
distributed,   
  is a function vector equal to   
      (  ( )), where γ = 0.5772 is Euler’s 
constant. 
 
 
